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Civil Procedure and the Establishment Clause: 
  Exploring the Ministerial Exception, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and the 
Freedom of the Church 
 
Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J.∗
 
Abstract 
 
What sort of defense is provided by the ministerial exception to employment 
discrimination claims?  The ministerial exception bars civil courts from reviewing the decisions 
of religious organizations regarding the employment of their ministerial employees.  While the 
exception itself is widely recognized by courts, there is confusion with respect to the proper 
characterization of the defense provided by the exception: should it seen as a subject matter 
jurisdiction defense, or as a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claim?  This 
Article argues that articulating the right answer to this question of civil procedure is crucial to a 
proper understanding of the role that the ministerial exception plays as a constitutional 
protection for the religious freedom of churches and other religious institutions.  The Article 
explores the ministerial exception to antidiscrimination law as a case study of the extent to which 
the U.S. Constitution adequately protects the freedom of the church.  The ministerial exception is 
best understood as a subject matter jurisdiction defense, and getting the right answer to this civil 
procedure question is not just a matter of citing the right procedural rule in the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss.  Instead, careful attention to this question leads to a better understanding of 
the foundations of our constitutional order.  When courts clearly and consistently treat the 
ministerial exception as a limitation on their subject matter jurisdiction, they make a powerful 
statement about the foundations of limited government – they affirm the penultimacy of the state.  
Yet, even though the jurisdictional approach to the ministerial exception does provide crucial 
protection for one dimension of institutional religious freedom, the Article suggests that the 
jurisdictional approach alone cannot provide an adequate constitutional foundation for robust 
protection of the freedom of the church. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What sort of defense is provided by the ministerial exception to employment 
discrimination claims?  The ministerial exception “bars civil courts from reviewing 
decisions of religious organizations relating to the employment of their ministers.”1  
Invoking this doctrine, courts routinely dismiss claims of race and sex discrimination 
brought by ministers against their religious employers under Title VII and other federal 
and state anti-discrimination laws.2  The doctrine serves to protect religious organizations 
from secular control or manipulation in the choice of employees who perform spiritual 
functions by “preclude[ing] any inquiry whatsoever into the reasons behind a church’s 
ministerial employment decision.”3  Rooted in the First Amendment’s protection for 
                                                 
1 Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 379 F. Supp.2d 907, 911 (W.D. Tenn. 2005), aff’d, 474 F.3d 223 
(6th Cir. 2007).  The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Posner, recently suggested that the doctrine 
might better be characterized as the “internal affairs” doctrine, because “[t]he assumption behind the rule 
… is that Congress does not want courts to interfere in the internal management of churches.”  Schleicher 
v. Salvation Army, 2008 WL 516892 (7th Cir. Feb. 28, 2008) at *2.  The doctrine protects churches from 
courts telling them “whom to ordain (or to retain as an ordained minister), how to allocate authority over 
the affairs of the church, or which rituals and observances are authentic. . . . That is why the ministers 
exception is better termed the ‘internal affairs’ doctrine.”  Id.  While Judge Posner’s suggestion accurately 
reflects the fundamental purpose of the doctrine, this Article will follow the practice of most courts in 
referring to the doctrine as the “ministerial exception.” 
2 See, e.g., Boggan v. Mississippi Conf. of the United Methodist Church, 222 Fed.Appx. 352 (5th Cir.), cert 
denied, 128 S. Ct. 63 (2007) (dismissing Title VII and § 1981 race discrimination claims); Combs v. 
Central Texas Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(dismissing Title VII sex discrimination claim); Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day 
Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985) (dismissing Title VII race and sex discrimination claims); 
Cronin v. South Indiana Annual Conference, United Methodist Church, 2007 WL 2258762 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 
3, 2007) (dismissing claim under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act); O’Connor v. Church 
of St. Ignatius Loyola, 779 N.Y.S.2d 31 (N.Y.A.D.), leave to appeal denied, 820 N.E. 2d 292 (N.Y. 2004), 
cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1017 (2005) (dismissing employment discrimination claims). 
3 EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 2000). 
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religious freedom, the exception recognizes that the Constitution protects “the unfettered 
right”4 of a church to make such employment decisions. 
While the protection recognized by the exception has itself been widely accepted 
by the federal and state courts, the proper characterization of the defense provided by the 
exception is a question on which courts disagree.5  Is the ministerial exception a subject 
matter jurisdiction bar to consideration of the plaintiff’s claim, or is it a challenge to the 
legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claim?  I will argue in this Article that articulating the 
right answer to this question of civil procedure is crucial to a proper understanding of the 
role that the ministerial exception plays as a constitutional protection for the religious 
freedom of churches and other religious institutions.  This technical question of civil 
procedure thus implicates a foundational principle of constitutional order. 
Citizens with a commitment to religious freedom might reasonably assume that 
institutional religious freedom – the freedom of the church to be the church – lies at the 
heart of the religious freedom protected by the First Amendment.6  Yet constitutional 
protection for the freedom of religious institutions to carry out their institutional religious 
missions seems to be under assault today.  This assault draws constitutional support from 
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith,7 where the 
Court held that neutral laws of general application do not run afoul of the Free Exercise 
                                                 
4 Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169. 
5 See, e.g., Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302-03 (3d Cir. 2006), cert denied, 127 S. Ct. 2098 
(2007); see also Petition for a Writ of Certioriari, Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 2007 WL 128608 (U.S. Jan. 
16, 2007), at *17 n. 3 (noting an emerging split on whether ministerial exception claims present a 
jurisdictional bar).  Cf. Schleicher, 2008 WL 516892, at *5 (arguing that the exception should be 
understood as a merits defense that should be resolved on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, see FED. 
R. CIV. PRO. 12(c), rather than a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). 
6 Carl H. Esbeck, The 60th Anniversary of the Everson Decision and America’s Church- State Proposition, 
23 J.L. & RELIGION 15, 41 (2007-08) (The central value of the First Amendment is, then, freedom in two 
senses – not only the cause of conscience in spiritual matters, but also including …the necessity of having 
the government step back so as to let the church be the church.”). 
7 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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clause even when those laws impose significant burdens on religious practice.8  The 
Court in Smith refused to recognize any constitutionally required free exercise exemption 
from Oregon’s drug laws for the religiously inspired use of peyote, even though the 
ingestion of peyote for sacramental purposes is a central component of worship in the 
Native American Church.9
Following Smith, courts have held that states are empowered to tell religious 
entities that their religiously motivated activities in society must comply with prevailing 
notions of morality that are embodied in the law, even when those laws come into 
conflict with the religious entities’ doctrinal commitments.  Thus, for example, relying on 
Smith, courts have required religiously affiliated social service agencies to comply with 
legislative mandates to include contraceptive coverage in their employees’ prescription 
drug benefits.10  In light of Smith, these rulings come “as no great surprise,”11 but they 
have implications extending beyond mandatory contraceptive coverage statutes.  As 
Professor Susan J. Stabile has noted, the legislation unsuccessfully challenged by 
religious employers in these cases establishes a “dangerous precedent”: 
[it] fails to respect the integrity of religious institutions, [thus] threatening the 
Church’s autonomy and right of self-definition. … The legislation in question 
raises a fundamental question of who decides what a religious institution is, and 
                                                 
8 See 494 U.S. at 878-882. 
9 Id. at 874; see also id. at 903-04 (“Peyote is a sacrament of the Native American Church and is regarded 
as vital to respondents’ ability to practice their religion. … Under Oregon law, as construed by that State’s 
highest court, members of the Native American Church must choose between carrying out their religious 
beliefs and avoidance of criminal prosecution.”) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
10 See Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 465 (N.Y. 2006) (Smith is an 
insuperable obstacle to plaintiffs’ federal free exercise claim.), cert.denied sub nom., Catholic Charities of 
the Diocese of Albany v. Dinallo, 128 S. Ct. 97 (2007); Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior 
Court, 85 P.3d 67, 81-90 (Cal. 2004) (discussing the applicability of Smith), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 816 
(2004).   
11 Susan J. Stabile, State Attempts to Define Religion: The Ramifications of Applying Mandatory 
Prescription Contraceptive Coverage Statutes to Religious Employers, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 741, 
744 (2005) . 
Forthcoming 17 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL (2008) 5
who defines the institution’s mission.  It also sets a dangerous precedent for even 
greater intrusions on religion in the future.12  
  
In contrast to these recent contraceptive mandate decisions, courts have uniformly 
held that a religious institution’s ministerial employees cannot invoke federal or state 
statutes that forbid employment discrimination on the basis of race and sex in order to 
challenge the employment decisions made by their religious employers.  Yet such anti-
discrimination statutes are neutral laws of general application.  Smith, therefore, can be 
read to support the conclusion that ministers seeking to bring sex or race discrimination 
claims against the religious institutions that employ them should not be barred from 
                                                 
12 Id. at 745.  The issues raised by these legislative mandate cases are not, of course, unique to Catholicism.  
Baptist institutions, for example, joined with Catholic Charities and other Catholic entities in challenging 
the New York contraception coverage mandate.  See Serio, 859 N.E. 2d at 462-63.  Yet the extensive 
network of Catholic social service institutions makes the question of institutional religious freedom 
particularly acute for the Catholic Church.  The stakes are high: 
The Catholic Church understands itself to be at the service of the human family, and the most 
tangible expression of that spirit is the network of charitable and social service institutions run by 
the church: schools, shelters, clinics, hospitals, counseling centers, and so on.  That service, 
howver, takes place in a pluralistic, secular culture governed by laws which do not always reflect 
the social and moral doctrine of Roman Catholicism.  One perennial issue for Catholic institutions, 
therefore, is the extent to which they can adapt themselves to secular mores in order to serve the 
largest population possible, without losing their Catholic identity. … The open question is to what 
extent the secular culture will be willing to bend to accommodate the deeply held moral beliefs of 
religious groups; and to what extent the Catholic Church, riding a strong wave of identity 
concerns, will feel the need to disentangle its institutions from partnerships with humanitarian 
groups or government agencies for fear of complicity in values at odds with church teaching. 
John Allen, Keynote Address, Symposium on the Jurisprudential Legacy of John Paul II, 45 J. CATH. 
LEGAL STUD. 229, 239 (2006).  This need to avoid complicity in values at odds with church teaching led 
Catholic Charities in the Archdiocese of Boston to discontinue providing adoption services under a contract 
with the state Department of Social Services, because Massachusetts law prohibits discrimination according 
to sexual orientation in the placement of adopted children.  The Archdiocese concluded that Catholic 
Charities could not cooperate with the placement of children with same-sex couples without violating the 
church’s teaching against legal recognition of same-sex unions.  Id.  In the absence of a legislative 
exemption from the general state law prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, 
Catholic Charities chose to cease providing an important social service, which it had been providing for 
over 100 years.  Since its founding, Catholic Charities had placed more children in homes than any other 
agency in the state, and it was widely respected as the “top private provider of adoptive homes for hard-to-
place foster children.”  Patricia Wen, “They Cared for the Children”; Amid Shifting Social Winds, Catholic 
Charities Prepares to End Its 103 Years of Finding Homes for Foster Children and Evolving Families, 
BOSTON GLOBE, at A1 (June 25, 2006); Patricia Wren, Catholic Charities Stuns State, Ends Adoptions, 
BOSTON GLOBE, at A1 (March 11, 2006) (noting that “[t]he agency was especially adept at finding homes 
for so-called ‘special needs’  adoptions, which include children who are older or who have significant 
physical or emotional disabilities”).       
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doing so.13  If the Court was willing in Smith to allow a state to criminalize the 
sacramental ingestion of peyote in the context of worship within the Native American 
Church, why should the government be prevented from requiring religious employers to 
bring their ministerial selection criteria into line with the requirements of neutral and 
generally applicable anti-discrimination law?14  Isn’t “[e]nding centuries of 
discrimination”15 on the basis of sex at least as important a goal as stemming the dangers 
that flow from the use of peyote?  Nonetheless, even in the wake of Smith, “courts and 
commentators still find it unimaginable that the Catholic Church or [the] Southern Baptist 
Convention might be required to comply with antidiscrimination law.  At some visceral 
level, it is considered an impossibility.”16
The ministerial exception is the legal doctrine invoked to protect religious 
institutions from the requirements of antidiscrimination law in the ministerial 
employment context.  First recognized by the Fifth Circuit in McClure v. Salvation 
Army,17 the exception has been widely adopted by the state and federal courts – although 
the U.S. Supreme Court itself has neither recognized nor rejected the ministerial 
                                                 
13 See Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from 
Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM. L. REV. 1965, 1983 (2007) (“Under Smith … the free exercise 
clause should not shield religious practices from Title VII); id. at 1984 (criticizing attempts made by courts 
and commentators to distinguish Smith in the ministerial exception context); but see Kathleen Brady, 
Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surprising Lessons of Smith, 2004 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1633, 
1649-56, 1672-79 (2004). 
14 See Corbin, Above the Law, supra note __, at 2003. 
15 Id.  See also Cass R. Sunstein, On the Tension between Sex Equality and Religious Freedom (2007), 
available at, SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=995325; Sarah Fulton, Note, Petruska v. Gannon 
University: A Crack in the Stained Glass Ceiling, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 197 (2007); Lauren P. 
Heller, Note, Modifying the Ministerial Exception: Providing Ministers with a Remedy for Employment 
Discrimination Under Title VII While Maintaining First Amendment Protections of Religious Freedom, 81 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 663 (2007); cf. Joshua Dunlap, Note, When Big Brother Plays God: The Religion 
Clauses, Title VII, and the Ministerial Exception, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2005 (2007). 
16 Corbin, Above the Law, supra note __, at 2003. 
17 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972). 
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exception.18  In order for the exception to apply, the employer must be a religious 
institution and the employee must function as a minister.19  The employer need not, 
however, be a church, diocese or synagogue, or an entity operated by such a religious 
organization.  Instead, a religious employer is any entity “‘whose mission is marked by 
clear or obvious religious characteristics.’”20  Thus, religiously affiliated schools and 
hospitals are religious employers for purposes of the ministerial exception.21  In addition, 
the category of ministerial employee is not limited to those who are ordained ministers.  
Instead, ministerial status is determined by considering the employee’s function within 
the religious institution.  The ministerial exception applies if “‘the employee’s primary 
duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a 
religious order, or supervision of religious ritual and worship.’”22  The exception has 
been applied to bar claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, as well as state 
common law claims.23   
While many courts have recognized and applied the ministerial exception, they 
have adopted a range of positions regarding the constitutional foundation for the doctrine.  
Prior to Smith, the exception was often thought to be rooted in the Free Exercise 
                                                 
18 Corbin, Above the Law, supra note __, at 1966 
19 Hollins, 474 F.3d at 225. 
20 Hollins, 474 F.3d at 226 (quoting Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Washington, Inc., 363 F.3d 
299, 310 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that a predominantly Jewish nursing home is a religious employer that can 
invoke the ministerial exception)). 
21 474 F.3d. at 225. 
22 474 F.3d. at 226 (quoting Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169); see Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name 
of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514, 
1545 (1979) (articulating the functional understanding of ministerial employees).  
23 Hollins, 474 F.3d at 225 (citing cases). 
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Clause.24  Many courts continue to adopt a free exercise rationale, even though the 
reasoning of Smith would seem to undermine that approach.25  Other courts and 
commentators see the exception as rooted in a right to church autonomy that is protected 
by the Establishment Clause, or in some combination of the First Amendment’s two 
religion clauses.26  Some level of constitutional protection for ministerial employment 
decisions might also be rooted in the Court’s precedents recognizing a First Amendment 
right of expressive association.27
To what extent might a doctrine like the ministerial exception provide a 
constitutional foundation for the freedom of the church to be the church?  Some scholars, 
including the Jesuit theologian John Courtney Murray, have suggested that protection for 
the freedom of the church was “codified” in the First Amendment.28  Murray argued that 
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment “sufficiently achieved” the important 
objective of guaranteeing the Church “a full independence in the fulfillment of her divine 
mission.”29  Others, including Professor Richard Garnett, are “not so sure.”30  Garnett 
                                                 
24 See, e.g., Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1168-69; see also Corbin, supra note __, at 1977-79; Douglas Laycock, 
Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to 
Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1396 (1981).  
25 See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 800-801 & 800 n.* (4th Cir. 
2000); Combs v. Central Texas Annual Conf. of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 347-50 (5th 
Cir. 1999); E.E.O.C. v. Cath. Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 461-63, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Brady, The 
Surprising Lessons of Smith, supra note __, at 1649-56. 
26 See, e.g., Corbin, supra note __, at 1979-80; Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Faith-Based Initiative 
and the Constitution, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 34 n. 162 (2005) (noting that the ministerial exception is “born 
of both Establishment and Free Exercise considerations”); See Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause 
as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 44, 49, 50 n. 201 (1998-99); cf. 
Schleicher, 2008 WL 516892, at *2 (while “the ministers exception is a rule of interpretation, not a 
constitutional rule,” it is derived from policies that “come from the establishment clause rather than from 
the free-exercise clause”). 
27 See Corbin, supra note __, at 1981, 2028-38; Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are 
Churches (Just) Like the Boy Scouts?, 22 St. John’s J. Legal Comment. 515, 517, 522, 528-30 (2007); 
Richard W. Garnett, The Freedom of the Church, 4 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 23 & n. 145 (2007), available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=916336. 
28 Garnett, The Freedom of the Church, supra note __, at 4.  See JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD 
THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 69-71 (1960). 
29 MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS, supra note __, at 70. 
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questions whether “there actually, is, in American constitutional law, a commitment to – 
or even room for” – a rich understanding of the freedom of the church.31  While there are 
a variety of constitutional doctrines, including the ministerial exception, that have the 
effect of protecting various dimensions of institutional religious freedom, Garnett 
suggests that constitutional doctrines like the ministerial exception “do not, in fact, 
evidence a robust, underlying commitment in our law to the libertas ecclesiae 
principle.”32
Even the ministerial exception may be difficult to square with the Court’s recent 
religion clause jurisprudence.  While some form of the ministerial exception might well 
be grounded in the Court’s expressive association precedents,33 the right of expressive 
association can be overcome by a compelling governmental interest.34  Given the anemic 
fashion in which courts often engage in compelling interest analysis when faced with a 
claim of religious freedom,35 freedom of expressive association may not end up 
providing robust protection to the freedom of the church, even when the church invokes 
religious doctrine in support of its ministerial selection criteria.  In the face of this 
doctrinal indeterminacy, Garnett asks a provocative question: does the libertas ecclesiae 
principle survive in the First Amendment, as Murray argued, and did it ever do “any real 
work, in Religion Clause theory and doctrine?”36  Garnett’s question prompts another, 
equally provocative, question: To what extent is it even possible to talk successfully 
                                                                                                                                                 
30 Garnett, Freedom of the Church, supra note __, at 4. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 5; see also id. at 13 (questioning whether the constitutionally protected religious liberty of believers 
expressing their beliefs in and through communities “is the same thing, and up to the same ‘revolutionary’ 
task,” as Murray “meant by the freedom of the Church”).  
33 See note 31 supra (citing Corbin and Garnett). 
34 Corbin, supra note __, at 2032-38. 
35 See, e.g., Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 91- (California contraceptive coverage mandate statute passes 
strict scrutiny under the free exercise clause of the California Constitution).  
36 Garnett, Freedom of the Church, supra note __, at 13. 
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about a theological principle like “the freedom of the church” in the language of the 
law?37
This Article endeavors to explore these questions by examining the ministerial 
exception to antidiscrimination law as a case study of the extent to which the U.S. 
Constitution adequately protects the freedom of the church.  The focus of this exploration 
will be the question of the nature of the defense provided by the ministerial exception: 
should the ministerial exception be characterized as a subject matter jurisdiction defense, 
or as a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claim?  And how is the answer 
to this procedural question related to the idea of the freedom of the church?   
Part I will briefly describe the confusion that currently exists regarding the nature 
of the defense provided by the ministerial exception.  Part II will discuss the theological 
principle of the freedom of the church, and argue that a proper understanding of this 
principle includes a jurisdictional distinction between church and state.  Part III will 
outline Prof. Carl Esbeck’s theory of the structural establishment clause, and suggest that 
his understanding of the establishment clause has important points of contact with 
Murray’s understanding of the jurisdictional implications of the freedom of the church.  
Esbeck’s structural understanding of the establishment clause demonstrates that the 
principle of the freedom of the church is not an idea entirely foreign to the U.S. 
Constitution.  Part IV will then explain why the ministerial exception is best understood 
as a subject matter jurisdiction defense. Getting the right answer to this civil procedure 
question is not just a matter of citing the right procedural rule in the defendant’s motion 
to dismiss; rather careful attention to this question will lead to a better understanding of 
                                                 
37 Cf. James Boyd White, Talking About Religion in the Language of the Law: Impossible But Necessary, 
81 MARQUETTE L. REV. 177 (1998). 
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the foundations of our constitutional order.  When courts clearly and consistently treat the 
ministerial exception as a limitation on the subject matter jurisdiction of the civil courts, 
they make a powerful statement about the foundations of limited government:  Such 
statements affirm the penultimacy of the state.  Yet, even though it provides crucial 
protection for a dimension of institutional religious freedom, the jurisdictional approach 
alone cannot provide an adequate constitutional foundation for robust protection of the 
freedom of the church. 
I.  PETRUSKA’S MISTAKE 
In Petruska v. Gannon University38 the Third Circuit wrongly concluded that the 
ministerial exception defense should be characterized as a challenge to the legal 
sufficiency of the plaintiffs claim.  Lynnette Petruska, a former University Chaplain at 
Gannon University, filed an employment discrimination action in federal court against 
Gannon, a private Catholic diocesan college.  Her claim alleged that she had been 
demoted as the result of a restructuring of the University Chaplain’s office, and that this 
action had been taken by the University on the basis of her gender. 
The university responded to her lawsuit by invoking the ministerial exception and 
filing a motion to dismiss her claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or in the 
alternative, for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted.  The district court 
granted the university’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and Petruska appealed.  
While the Third Circuit agreed that the ministerial exception required the district court to 
dismiss Petruska’s sex discrimination action, the court did not believe that the ministerial 
exception should be understood as a jurisdictional bar.  Instead, the court noted that the 
                                                 
38 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2098 (2007). 
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ministerial exception is properly raised in a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.39
The Petruska court maintained that the ministerial exception should not be 
considered a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, because, in its view, the exception does 
not take away a federal court’s very power to hear this sort of case.  The court explained 
that “it is beyond cavil that a federal district court has the authority to review claims 
arising under federal law,”40 and Petruska had asserted a sex discrimination claim arising 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Because the claim arose under a federal 
statute, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the case. 
Rather than seeing the exception as a constitutionally mandated limit on the 
subject matter jurisdiction of civil courts, the Petruska court drew on precedent from the 
Ninth and Tenth Circuits in support of its conclusion that the ministerial exception is best 
characterized as a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claim.41  While a 
federal court does have subject matter jurisdiction to hear this sort of claim arising under 
a federal employment discrimination statute, the First Amendment bars a court from 
granting relief to a ministerial employee asserting such a claim.  In this respect, the court 
explained, the ministerial exception is like a government official’s defense of qualified 
                                                 
39 462 F.3d at 302. 
40 439 F.3d at 302.  See also Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 955 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(“Federal question jurisdiction is statutorily established, giving district courts ‘original jurisdiction of all 
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.’ 28 U.S.C. § 1331.”) 
(holding that the ministerial exception should not be understood as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction); 
cf. Bollard v. California Province of the Society of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 951 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[a]ny non-
frivolous assertion of a federal claim suffices to establish federal question jurisdiction, even if that claim is 
later dismissed on the merits”); see also Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946) (“Jurisdiction . . . is not 
defeated . . . by the possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners 
might actually recover. . . . [T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits 
and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.”). 
41 439 F.3d at 302 (citing Elvig, 375 F.3d at 955 and Bryce v. Episcopal Church of the Diocese of 
Colorado, 289 F.3d 648, 654 (10th Cir. 2002 
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immunity.42  The court noted that defendants often raise the issue of qualified immunity 
in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim; it is not a matter of 
subject matter jurisdiction.  As in the case of qualified immunity, the ministerial 
“exception may serve as a barrier to the success of a plaintiff’s claims, but it does not 
affect the court’s authority to consider them.”43
While the Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits44 view the ministerial exception as a 
challenge to the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claim, other courts characterize it as a 
subject matter jurisdiction bar.  As the Sixth Circuit recently explained, 
[t]he ministerial exception, a doctrine rooted in the First Amendment’s 
guarantees of religious freedom, precludes subject matter jurisdiction over claims 
involving the employment relationship between a religious institution and its 
ministerial employees, based on the institution’s constitutional right to be free 
from judicial interference in the selection of those employees.45
   
Thus, to raise the ministerial exception as a defense to an employment discrimination 
claim is to challenge the court’s very power to hear and decide a ministerial employee’s 
claim against a religious institution.46  A large number of courts share this jurisdictional 
understanding of the ministerial exception.47  As the Seventh Circuit noted in another 
                                                 
42 462 F.3d at 302 (citing Bryce v. Episcopal Church of the Diocese of Colorado, 289 F.3d 648, 654 (10th 
Cir. 2002) (“If the church autonomy doctrine applies to the statements and materials on which plaintiffs 
have based their claims, then the plaintiffs have no claim for which relief may be granted.  In this sense, the 
assertion that the First Amendment precludes the sexual harassment suit is similar to a government 
official’s defense of qualified immunity . . . .) 
43 462 F.3d at 303. 
44 The Tenth Circuit in Bryce was considering the related “church autonomy doctrine,” rather than the 
ministerial exception itself.  See Petruska, 462 F.3d at 302. 
45 Hollins v. Methodist Health Care, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225 (6th Cir. 2007).  
46 See Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 
IOWA L. REV. 1, 42-43 (1998-99) (noting that a jurisdictional dismissal “is a concession that the issue in 
dispute … is not within the court’s constitutional power” to decide; “Jurisdiction, of course, concerns the 
scope of a court’s power as defined by the Constitution.”).  
47 See, e.g., Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1038 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 
190 (2006); E.E.O.C. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000); Combs v. 
Central Tex. Annual Conf. of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 345 (5th Cir. 1999); Minker v. 
Baltimore Annual Conf. of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (rejecting 
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recent ministerial exception case, secular courts have no power to speak – i.e., no 
jurisdiction – with respect to the issues surrounding a religious body’s choice of 
ministerial employees.48   
II.  JURISDICTION AND THE FREEDOM OF THE CHURCH 
 John Courtney Murray was confident that the important objective of safeguarding 
the freedom of the church was “sufficiently achieved by the religious provisions of the 
First Amendment.”49  Murray argued that a jurisdictional “distinction between church 
and state”50 was affirmed by the Constitution, and this distinction was adequate to protect 
the freedom of the church: 
This affirmation is made through the imposition of limits on government, which is 
confined to its own proper ends, those of temporal society. … [T]he American 
Constitution does not presume to define the Church or in any way to supervise her 
exercise of authority in pursuit of her own distinct ends.  The Church is entirely 
                                                                                                                                                 
minister’s assertion “that lay courts have jurisdiction to hear his age discrimination claims”); Patsakis v. 
Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America, 339 F. Supp. 2d 689, 692-93 (W.D. Pa. 2004) (“The propriety of 
asserting the ‘ministerial exception’ defense through a 12(b)(1) motion . . . is well-established.”); Musante 
v. Notre Dame of Easton Church, 2004 WL 721774, *5 (D. Conn. 2004) (“When the ministerial exception 
applies, courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over the case.”); Pardue v. Center City Consortium Schools 
of the Archdiocese of Washington, Inc., 875 A.2d 669, 674 (DC 2005) (“Our own decisions most 
analogous to this case teach that the Archdiocese’s motion to dismiss on First Amendment grounds is 
properly analyzed as a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under [Rule] 12(b)(1).”); Van Osdol v. Vogt, 
908 P.2d 1122, 1134 (Col. 1996) (ministerial exception precludes court “from taking jurisdiction” over the 
claims); Rweyemamu v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, 2006 WL 3511771, *3 (Conn. 
App. 2006) (“It bears emphasis that the ministerial exception is jurisdictional rather than evidentiary.  
Religious institutions need not rely on proof of affirmative defenses in employment discrimination suits but 
may categorically resist the judicial intrusion implicit in inquiry into their employment practices and 
relationships.”); Malichi v. Archdiocese of Miami, 2006 WL 3207982, *1 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 2006) (“[C]ivil 
courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction …to consider Appellant’s claim because it constitutes an internal 
employment dispute between a priest and his church.”); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Faith-Based 
Initiative and the Constitution, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 34 n.162 (2005) (the limitations of the ministerial 
exception “go to subject-matter jurisdiction of the civil courts”); Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a 
Structural Restraint, supra note __, at 49 & 50 n. 201; see also Dolquist v. Heartland Presbytery, 342 F. 
Supp.2d 996, 998-99 (D. Kan. 2004) (noting that some courts have characterized the ministerial exception 
as jurisdictional, while others have held that it is more appropriately characterized as a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claim under Rule 12(b)(6); cf. Schleicher, 2008 WL 516892, at *5 
(characterizing the doctrine as a merits defense that should be raised in a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment 
on the pleadings). 
48  Tomic, 442 F.3d at 1037. 
49 MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS, supra note __, at 70. 
50 Id.; see also id. at 65 (noting that the “distinction between the spiritual and temporal orders and their 
respective jurisdictions” was a “key principle” for Roger Williams). 
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free to define herself and to exercise to the full her spiritual jurisdiction.  It is 
legally recognized that there is an area which lies outside the competence of 
government.  This area coincides with the area of the divine mission of the 
Church, and within this area the Church is fully independent, immune from 
interference by political authority.51
 
Murray concluded that “[i]n the United States the freedom of the Church was completely 
unfettered; she could organize herself with the full independence which is her native 
right.”52
What is the extent of the area of “spiritual jurisdiction” that lies beyond the 
interference of political authority?  The Second Vatican Council’s Declaration on 
Religious Freedom, a document on which Murray’s thought exercised significant 
influence,53 characterized the theological principle of the freedom of the church in this 
way: the “freedom of the Church is the fundamental principle in what concerns the 
relations between the Church and governments and the whole civil order.”54  The Church 
claims for herself that “full measure of freedom which her care for the salvation of men 
requires,” and she bases that claim “in her character as a spiritual authority, established 
by Christ the Lord,” and given by divine mandate “the duty of going out into the whole 
world and preaching the gospel to every creature.”55
 The Declaration on Religious Freedom also articulates an alternative rationale for 
the principle of the freedom of the Church that is not rooted in the unique mandate given 
by Christ to his Church: the Church “also claims freedom for herself in her character as a 
society of men who have the right to live in society in accordance with the precepts of the 
                                                 
51 Id. at 70. 
52 Id. at 71. 
53 See Leslie Griffin, Commentary on on Dignitatis humanae (Declaration on Religious Freedom) in 
MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING: COMMENTARIES & INTERPRETATIONS 249, 250-54, 257 (Kenneth 
R. Himes, O.F.M., ed. 2005).  
54 Declaration on Religious Freedom, #13, in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 693 (Walter M. Abbot, S.J., 
ed. 1966).  
55 Id, at 694. 
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Christian faith.”56  “Religious bodies are a requirement of the social nature both of man 
and of religion itself.”57  Thus, the freedom from coercion in religious matters that flows 
from the dignity of the human person gives rise to a freedom from coercion when 
individuals act in community.  Understood in this way, the freedom claimed by the 
Catholic Church is a freedom shared by all churches and religious communities, and the 
content or object of the right protected by the principle of the freedom of the church is the 
same for the Catholic Church and all other religious bodies.58
 The content of the institutional freedom demanded by the principle of the freedom 
of the church is spelled out in article 4 of the Declaration on Religious Freedom.  As the 
first words of the relevant text make clear, the principle of the freedom of the church does 
not demand an absolute freedom from any legal regulation: 
Provided the just requirements of public order are observed, religious bodies 
rightfully claim freedom in order that they may govern themselves according to 
their own norms, honor the Supreme Being in public worship, assist their 
members in the practice of the religious life, strengthen them by instruction, and 
promote institutions in which they may join together for the purpose of ordering 
their own lives in accordance with their religious principles.59
 
 The freedom of the church also gives rise to freedom from coercion in the areas of 
church life most directly relevant to the ministerial exception: 
Religious bodies also have the right not to be hindered, either by legal measures 
or by administrative action on the part of government, in the selection, training, 
                                                 
56 Id.   
57 Id., #4, at 682.  
58 See John Courtney Murray, S.J., Commentary and Notes on the Declaration on Religious Freedom, in 
THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 682 n. 9 (Walter M. Abbot, S.J., ed. 1966).  The foundation of the freedom 
claimed by the Catholic Church is the unique mandate of Christ.  “In the case of other religious 
Communities, the foundation of the right is the dignity of the human person, which requires that men be 
kept free from coercion, when they act in community, gathered into Churches, as well as when they act 
alone.” Id.; see also Declaration on Religious Freedom, #13, supra note __, at 694 (Because all people 
“possess the civil right not to be hindered in leading their lives in accordance with their conscience[,] a 
harmony exists between the freedom of the Church  and the religious freedom which is to be recognized as 
the right of all men and communities and sanctioned by constitutional law.”). 
59 Declaration on Religiouis Freedom, #4, supra note __, at 682 (emphasis added). 
Forthcoming 17 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL (2008) 17
appointment, and transferal of their own ministers, in communicating with 
religious authorities and communities abroad, in erecting buildings for religious 
purposes, and in the acquisition and use of suitable funds or properties.60
 
The freedom of the church also protects the freedom of the church to speak in the public 
square, both in order to spread the faith and in order to influence public policy: 
Religious bodies also have the right not to be hindered in their public teaching and 
witness to their faith, whether by the spoken or by the written word.… In 
addition, it comes with in the meaning of religious freedom that religious bodies 
should not be prohibited from freely undertaking to show the special value of 
their doctrine in what concerns the organization of society and the inspiration of 
the whole of human activity.61
 
As Murray notes, by affirming the right to bring the insights of faith to bear on the 
whole of human activity – including questions of public policy – the principle of the 
freedom of the church stands against any attempts to argue that religion is a purely 
private affair that must be kept confined to the sacristy.  Instead, the Declaration insists 
that “[r]eligion is relevant to the life and action of society.  Therefore religious freedom 
includes the right to point out this social relevance of religious belief.”62  This aspect of 
the freedom of the church is indeed “a core religious function”; it is an “integral part of 
the practice of religion to speak to the moral and spiritual dimensions of social issues.”63  
The effective exercise of this aspect of the freedom of the church empowers the Church 
to be the Church by serving as a voice speaking out to protect the dignity and 
                                                 
60 Id. (emphasis added). 
61 Id., at 682-83.  The Declaration also explains that “the social nature of man and the very nature of 
religion afford the foundation of the right of men freely to hold meetings and to establish educational, 
cultural, charitable, and social organizations, under the impulse of their own religious sense.” Id., at 683.  
62 Murray, Commentary and Notes on the Declaration, supra note __, at 683 n. 11. 
63 Robert T. Kennedy, Contributions of Dignitatis Humanae to Church-State Relations in the United States, 
in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PAUL VI AND DIGNITATIS HUMANAE 103 (John T. Ford, C.S.C., ed., 1995).  See also 
Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, #76, in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 288-89 
(Walter M. Abbot, S.J., ed. 1966) (“[I]t is always and everywhere legitimate for [the Church] to preach the 
faith with true freedom, to teach her social doctrine, and to discharge her duty among men without 
hindrance.”). 
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transcendence of the human person in the face of state efforts to assert omniscient 
omnicompetence over all areas of human life and human activity.64
 The Declaration confidently asserts that where these components of the principle 
of the freedom of the church are taken seriously in law and in practical application, “there 
the Church succeeds in achieving a stable situation of right as well as of fact and the 
independence which is necessary for the fulfillment of her divine mission.  This 
independence is precisely what the authorities of the Church claim in society.”65  Taken 
as a whole, the Declaration on Religious Freedom teaches that the freedom of the Church 
– the independence necessary for the fulfillment of the Church’s divine mission – is not 
an absolute freedom.  Instead, it is an assertion of internal institutional autonomy and 
freedom from arbitrary regulation.66  As article 4 of the Declaration makes clear, the just 
demands of public order (the promotion of justice, peace, and public morality) may give 
rise to reasonable regulation of the activity of the Church in the temporal sphere without 
violating the principle of the freedom of the Church.67  
 That assertion, of course, begs a critical question: who is to determine when 
regulation of the activity of the Church is a reasonable response to the just demands of 
public order, and how is that determination to be made?  In other words, “when, and to 
what extent, may civil government place restrictions upon the exercise of religious 
                                                 
64 See MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS, supra note __, at 68 (the American understanding of separation 
of church and state rejects “the juridical omnipotence and omnicompetence of the state”). 
65 Declaration on Religious Freedom, #13, supra note __, at 694. 
66 Kennedy, Contributions of Dignitatis Humanae, supra note __, at 96, 97 (Church and state “[e]ach must 
enjoy internal autonomy; each must respect the freedom of the other to fulfill its function in service to the 
larger society of which it is a part; neither may assume the role and responsibilities of the other.”). 
67 Id. at 96 (the independence ‘necessary for the fulfillment of the Church’s divine mission,’ is “not an 
absolute independence denying all regulatory authority in civil government”).  The components of public 
order – justice, peace, and public morality – are outlined in #7 of the Declaration.  See Declaration on 
Religious Freedom, supra note __, at 685-87; see also Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J., Moral Limits on Morals 
Legislation: Lessons for U.S. Constitutional Law from the Declaration on Religious Freedom, 16 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 14-30 (2006) (discussing the role played by the concept of public order in the 
Declaration)  
Forthcoming 17 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL (2008) 19
freedom?”68  Current U.S. constitutional doctrine provides a distressingly expansive 
answer to this question.  The Court in Employment Division v. Smith, held that the free 
exercise clause provides no protection for religious freedom when a neutral law of 
general application incidentally imposes a burden on religiously motivated activity – no 
matter how significant that burden might be, and no matter how insignificant a threat to 
the government’s interest in promoting public order might be posed by judicial 
recognition of an exception to the regulation.69
 The Declaration on Religious Freedom did provide some specificity regarding the 
elements of the public order component of the common good: the state acts properly 
through law when its objective is to promote justice, public peace, and public morality.  
The Declaration did not, however, specify what sort of legal framework ought to be 
employed in order to determine when the demands of public order justify placing a 
particular restriction on the exercise of religious freedom, nor did it take a position on 
what institution – the judiciary or the legislature – should have the primary role in 
determining whether a particular restriction is reasonable in light of the demands of 
public order.  As John Courtney Murray himself recognized, “the criterion of public order 
remains general, in need of further specification, and subject to abuse.”70  The Smith rule 
seems to enhance dramatically the possibility that the public order criterion will be 
abused by legislatures insensitive to the demands of religious freedom or opposed to the 
                                                 
68 Kennedy, Contributions of Dignitatis Humanae, supra note __, at 107.  John Courtney Murray saw this 
question as the “‘crucial issue’ in the care of religion by government.”  Id. (citing John Courtney Murray, 
S.J., The Problem of Religious Freedom, 25 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 519, 527, 528 (1964)). 
69 See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Garnett, Freedom of the Church, supra note 
__, at 16. 
70 Kennedy, Contributions of Dignitatis Humanae, supra note __, at 108 (emphasis added). 
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sort of challenge that the robust recognition of the freedom of the Church presents to the 
ideology of state monism. 
Acknowledging the potential for abuse of the public order criterion, Murray 
argued that the state through law could restrict “religious expression (in public rites, 
teaching, observance, or behavior) only when such forms of public expression seriously 
violate either the public peace or commonly accepted standards of public morality, or the 
rights of other citizens.”71  Murray recognized that a practical problem arises in trying to 
apply this general principle to particular cases – how to avoid arbitrary application of the 
public order principle by the public power?  Murray responded to this problem by 
outlining four fundamental requirements that should be adhered to in the casuistry that 
necessarily develops as the principle is applied in practice: 
that the violation of the public order be really serious; that legal or police 
intervention be really necessary; that regard be had for the privileged character of 
religious freedom, which is not simply to be equated with other civil rights; and 
the rule of jurisprudence of the free society be strictly observed, scil., as much 
freedom as possible, as much coercion as necessary.72
 
The Smith rule takes none of these requirements into account.  In contrast, Robert 
T. Kennedy argues that “Murray’s four requirements come close to expressing the 
essence of a legal doctrine used for many years by American courts [prior to Smith] to 
assess the constitutionality of legislation” that substantially burdened the free exercise of 
                                                 
71 John Courtney Murray, S.J., The Problem of Religious Freedom, 25 THEOLOGICAL STUD., 519, 530 
(1964) (emphasis added). 
72 Id.  Murray further explained that the issues of casuistry “will call for a continual dialogue between the 
public powers and the personal and political consciousness of the citizenry, with a view to finding equitable 
solutions. . . . What chiefly matters is that free exercise of religion should always be responsible. . . . What 
further matters is the spirit of tolerance, as a moral attitude, among the citizenry – a spirit of reverence and 
respect for others, which issues in an abhorrence of coercion in religious matters.” Id.  If this moral attitude 
of tolerance is weak among the citizenry, and especially if this attitude is weak among their legislative 
representatives, the Smith rule seriously erodes robust constitutional protection for religious freedom. 
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religion.73  Under the compelling interest test articulated by the Court in Sherbert v. 
Verner,74 the government was prohibited from burdening religious exercise “unless the 
government is able to demonstrate that the restriction is necessary to further a paramount 
or compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of doing so.”75  
Kennedy contends that this pre-Smith constitutional rule of strict scrutiny of laws that 
burden religious freedom was “entirely consistent” with the teaching of the Declaration, 
presumably including its teaching on the freedom of the Church.76  Prior to Smith, then, it 
might not have been so hard to identify within the Free Exercise clause of the First 
Amendment adequate constitutional protection for the freedom of the Church.  After 
Smith, greater attention must be paid to other constitutional foundations for that freedom.  
It may be time to take more seriously the dimension of the principle of the freedom of the 
church that finds expression in the jurisdictional distinction between church and state.  
The principle of the freedom of the church finds its origins in a jurisdictional 
conflict.  The eleventh century papal call for “the freedom of the church” was a call for 
“the liberation of the clergy from imperial, royal, and feudal domination and their 
unification under papal authority.”77  Thus, the cry for the “freedom of the church” was a 
                                                 
73 Kennedy, Contributions of Dignitatis Humanae, supra note __, at 108. 
74 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). 
75 Kennedy, Contributions of Dignitatis Humanae, supra note __, at 108. 
76 Id. at 110.  Thus, Kennedy concludes the teaching of the Declaration on Religious Freedom “calls to the 
American legal system to return to one of the more resplendent of its constitutional features.”  Id.  But see 
Smith, 494 U.S. at 883 (noting that, outside the Sherbert context of the denial of unemployment 
compensation, the Court “has always found the [Sherbert] test satisfied”). 
77 HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 103-
04 (1983).  The “principal aim of the papal revolution” was “expressed in the slogan, ‘the freedom of the 
church.’”  Id. at 105.  Berman notes that the freedom of the church “was not something that could be 
achieved overnight – indeed, in its deepest significance it was not something that could be achieved ever – 
yet the very depth of the idea, its combination of great simplicity and great complexity, was a guarantee 
that the struggle to achieve it would be, on the one hand, a prolonged one, over decades and generations 
and even centuries, and on the other hand, a cataclysmic one, with drastic and often violent changes 
occurring in rapid succession.”  Id. 
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cry for “its freedom from control by ‘the laity.’”78  The plurality of jurisdictions and legal 
systems coexisting and competing within one community that Harold Berman argues is 
“[p]erhaps the most distinctive characteristic of the Western legal tradition” was itself the 
product of the church’s medieval insistence on its institutional freedom from lay, imperial 
domination:  “The church declared its freedom from secular control, its exclusive 
jurisdiction in some matters, and its concurrent jurisdiction other matters. … The very 
complexity of a legal order containing diverse legal systems contributed to legal 
sophistication.”79
Murray characterized the dual jurisdiction flowing from the “ancient distinction 
between church and state” – “[t]he dualism of mankind’s two hierarchically ordered 
forms of social life” – as “Christianity’s cardinal contribution to the Western political 
tradition.”80  And Murray understood the limitations on governmental power articulated 
in the First Amendment as the constitutional vehicle that brought this strand of the 
Western political tradition into the American constitutional order.  As Murray explained: 
The juridical result of the American limitation on governmental powers is the 
guarantee to the Church of a stable condition of freedom.… It should be added 
that this guarantee is not only to the individual … but to the Church as an 
organized society with its own law and jurisdiction … Within society, as distinct 
from the state, there is room for the independent exercise of authority that is not 
that of the state.81
 
                                                 
78 Id. at 108.  Berman argues that it was out of this controversy that “the first Western theories of the state 
and of secular law … were born.”  Id. at 111. 
79 Id. at 10. 
80 MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS, supra note __, at 64. 
81 MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS, surpa note __, at 78-79 (emphasis added), quoted in Esbeck, 
Establishment Clause as a Sturcutral Restraint, supra note __, at 55 n. 228. Murray notes that the U.S. 
Supreme Court affirmed this principle of Church freedom in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 
(1952).  The Kedroff case is discussed at note __, infra.  See also Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J., John Paul II, 
John Courtney Murray, and Relationship between Civil Law and Moral Law: A Constructive Proposal for 
Contemporary American Pluralism, 1 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 231, 245-48, 265-66 (2004) (discussing the 
distinction between state and society as a central feature of Catholic social thought). 
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An incident from the early history of the American republic recounted by Leo 
Pfeffer in his book, Church, State and Freedom, indicates that the founders themselves 
understood the jurisdictional separation that is part of the “ancient distinction between 
church and state” and recognized the limits of civil authority with respect to the 
preexisting, organized society that is the church: 
In 1783 the papal nuncio at Paris addressed a note to Benjamin Franklin 
suggesting that, since it was no longer possible to maintain the previous status 
whereunder American Catholics were subject to the Vicar Apostolic in London, 
the Holy See proposed to Congress that a Catholic bishopric be established in one 
of the American cities.  Franklin transmitted the note to the [Continental] 
Congress, which directed Franklin to notify the nuncio that ‘the subject of his 
application to Doctor Franklin being purely spiritual, it is without the jurisdiction 
and powers of Congress, who have no authority to permit or refuse it, these 
powers being reserved to the several states individually.’ (Not many years later 
the several states would likewise declare themselves to ‘have no authority to 
permit or refuse’ such a purely spiritual exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction.)82
 
Commenting on this incidence, Murray noted that it had been “centuries [since] the Holy 
See [had] been free to erect a bishopric and appoint a bishop without the prior consent of 
government [and] all the legal formalities with which Catholic states had fettered the 
freedom of the Church.”  This led Murray to conclude that, “[i]n the United States, the 
freedom of the Church was completely unfettered; she could organize herself with the 
full independence which is her native right.”83  For Murray, jurisdictional independence 
was evidence of the “stability of the Church’s condition at law” that is “the root of the 
matter” of the freedom of the church.84  The ancient recognition of a sphere of 
jurisdiction reserved to the church that is beyond the authority of civil government finds 
                                                 
82 LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 121 (1953), quoted in MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE 
TRUTHS, supra note __, at 71.  See also Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State 
Settlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385 (describing the disestablishment 
process in the states).  
83 MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS, supra note __, at 71. 
84 Id. 
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its American constitutional analog in what Professor Carl Esbeck describes as the 
jurisdictional nature of the structural Establishment Clause.  The structural Establishment 
Clause protects a reserved sphere in which the freedom of the church is secure; a sphere 
“in which religious entities may operate unhindered by government in accordance with 
their own understanding of divine origin and mission.”85
III.  JURISDICTION AND THE STRUCTURAL ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE  
  Rather than trying to demonstrate why Smith does not eliminate a free exercise 
foundation for the ministerial exception, commentators like Carl Esbeck, Ira Lupu, and 
Robert Tuttle argue that the ministerial exception is best understood as a jurisdictional 
bar rooted in the establishment clause.  Esbeck, for example, maintains that the line of 
Supreme Court precedent that gives rise to the ministerial exception “is more easily 
understood when the Establishment Clause is conceptualized as a structural restraint on 
government’s power to act on certain matters pertaining to religion.”86  The 
Establishment Clause as a structural principle operates by policing a jurisdictional 
boundary.  Indeed, the structural Establishment Clause is a “model of dual 
jurisdictions”87 – the clause separates “two spheres of competence,”88 government and 
religion, and orders the relationship that exists between those two spheres.  Some matters 
fall within the competence of civil government, others remain in the exclusive sphere of 
religion, and others might be shared by religion and government.89  
                                                 
85 Esbeck, Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint, supra note __, at 55-56.  See also notes 51-54 
supra & accompanying text (discussing the Catholic Church’s understanding of its divine origin and 
mission and the general issue of the freedom of religious institutions). 
86 Esbeck, Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint, supra note __, at 3-4. 
87 Id. at 28. 
88 Id. at 10. 
89 Id. at 14, 31. 
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Understood in this way, the structural Establishment Clause serves as a powerful 
witness to a fundamental commitment of American constitutionalism:  the government is 
as an entity of limited authority.  Esbeck draws on the work of William Clancy and Max 
L. Stackhouse to illustrate this point.  Clancy, for example, explains that the logical 
distinction between government and religion as two separate orders of competence shows 
that “Caesar recognizes that he is only Caesar and forswears any attempt to demand what 
is God’s.  (Surely this is one of history’s more encouraging examples of secular 
modesty.)  The State realistically admits that there are severe limits on its authority and 
leaves the churches free to perform their work in society.”90
Max Stackhouse sees the distinction between government and religion that is 
recognized in the Establishment Clause as governmental recognition of religion as a sort 
of co-equal, competing sovereign, outside the state’s control with respect to religious 
matters: 
[The First] Amendment to the Constitution acknowledges the existence of an 
arena of discourse, activity, commitment, and organization for the ordering of life 
over which the state has no authority.  It is a remarkable thing in human history 
when the authority governing coercive power limits itself …. However much 
government may become involved in regulating various aspects of economic, 
technological, medical, cultural, educational, and even sexual behaviors in 
society, religion is an area that, when it is doing its own thing, is off limits.  This 
is not only an affirmation of the freedom of individual belief or practice, not only 
an acknowledgement that the state is noncompetent when it comes to theology, it 
is the recognition of a sacred domain that no secular authority can fully control.  
Practically, this means that least one association may be brought into being in 
society that has a sovereignty beyond the control of government.91
 
                                                 
90 William Clancy, Religion as a Source of Tension, in RELIGION AND THE FREE SOCIETY 23, 27-28 (1958), 
quoted in Esbeck, Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint, supra note __, at 10 n. 34. 
91 Max L. Stackhouse, Religion, Rights, and the Constitution, in AN UNSETTLED ARENA: RELIGION AND 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 92, 111 (Ronald C. White, Jr. & Albright G.Zimmerman eds., 1990), quoted in 
Esbeck, Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint, supra note __, at 10 n. 34 (emphasis added). 
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How to define the sovereign arena in which religion “is doing its own thing” may present 
us with significant challenges, but the fundamental point is clear.  The structural 
Establishment Clause affirms limited government by recognizing that some matters lie 
within an exclusive sphere of religion that is off-limits to governmental regulation. 
Like John Courtney Murray,92 Esbeck notes that this sort of jurisdictional division 
of authority has deep roots in the Western jurisprudential tradition.  Esbeck, for example, 
quotes Roscoe Pound’s description of the jurisdictional division that prevailed in the 
Middle Ages: “In the politics and law of the Middle Ages the distinction between the 
spiritual and temporal, between the jurisdiction of religiously organized Christendom and 
the jurisdiction of the temporal sovereign, that is, of politically organized society, was 
fundamental.”93  This sort of division of authority and jurisdiction reflects the conviction 
that the temporal power is “not the sole possessor of sovereignty.”94  The freedom of the 
church within the religious realm is aptly described as a “sovereign authority.”  
Government and religion might be seen as “cosovereigns” in this sense:  there is a 
territory beyond civil affairs that is “reserved to the churches.”95  To characterize 
government and religion as cosovereigns is to recognize that the churches are not simply 
voluntary organizations that exist at the sufferance of the state.  They are not simply 
“jural entities, and not mere creatures of the law deriving their existence from the state.  
                                                 
92 See text at notes __ - __, supra. 
93 Roscoe Pound, A Comparison of Ideals of Law, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1933), quoted in Esbeck, 
Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint, supra note __, at 50 n. 206); see also MURRAY, WE HOLD 
THESE TRUTHS, supra note __, at 64 (noting that the “ancient distinction between church and state” – [t]he 
dualism of mankind’s two hierarchically ordered forms of social life” – “had been Christianity’s cardinal 
contribution to the Western political tradition”). 
94 Esbeck, Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint, supra note __, at 54 n. 225 (quoting Mark 
DeWolfe Howe, Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV. L. REV. 91, 92-95 (1953)) 
95 Id. 
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Rather, churches preexisted the state, are transnational, and would continue to exist if the 
state were suddenly dissolved or destroyed.”96   
 Acknowledging the churches as social actors possessing independent authority 
that is not that of the state places a powerful limit on the power of the state.  Such an 
acknowledgment affirms that the state’s assertion of sovereignty is not absolute.  The 
protection of the freedom of churches as “sovereigns” not created by the state points to 
the existence of another sovereignty (the only true sovereignty) – that of a God (or gods) 
– existing “beyond, before, and superior to the state.”97  Esbeck explains that “theistic 
religions posit a Sovereignty that sits in judgment over the state, its ambitions to temporal 
power, and its pretensions of infallibility.  It is for this reason that at crucial points in 
Western history the institutional church had a ‘pivotal role in guarding against political 
absolutism.’”98
As institutions that give public witness, each in their own way, to absolute Truths 
that transcend politics, the churches relativize politics.  Religion has political implications 
simply by asserting that political truth does not encompass the totality of all that humans 
                                                 
96 Id. at 55. 
97 Id. at 67.  Cf. Patrick McKinley Brennan, Against Sovereignty: A Cautionary Note on the Normative 
Power of the Actual, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 135 (2006) (“after all, [God] is sovereign if anyone 
be”).  Drawing on the work of Judge John T. Noonan, Brennan notes that the American commitment to 
constitutional protection for religious freedom can be understood as a recognition of God’s sovereignty: 
[I]t allows us human subjects to meet our indefeasible duty to inform conscience and freely follow  
the will of the sovereign God.…We must resist the Court’s and others’ claims on behalf of false 
sovereigns, not because we ourselves are individual sovereigns, but because, with respect to 
seeking to instantiate the good, personal and common both, we operate under an obligation that is 
nothing short of sovereign.  The natural law that gives birth to this right of ours to self-government 
is itself our intelligent participation as human subjects in the Eternal Law, the mind of the 
sovereign God sweetly disposing all things to their proper ends. 
Id. at 142-43. 
98 Esbeck, Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint, supra note __, at 67 (quoting Gerard V. Bradley, 
Church Autonomy in the Constitutional Order: The End of Church and State, 49 LA. L. REV. 1057, 1072 
(1989)).  See also MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS, supra note __, at 204-05 (“[T]he freedom of the 
Church as the spiritual authority served as the limiting principle of the power of government.”); Garnett, 
The Freedom of the Church, supra note __, at 20 (“[T]here are reasons to think that the libertas ecclesiae 
has mattered and does matter for the development and sustaining of constitutionally limited government.”). 
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can desire and know.  By “relativizing the political,” religion “operates to expand that 
social space that is nongovernmental.”99  Those matters that fall under the exclusive 
sovereignty of religion are beyond the jurisdiction of government.100  The resulting social 
space “gives breathing room to individuals, families, neighborhoods, and other mediating 
groups.”101  All this, Esbeck maintains, follows from a structural, jurisdictional 
understanding of the Establishment clause.  
 How does the structural Establishment Clause define the boundary between the 
sphere of government and that of religion?  This, Esbeck notes, “resolves itself down to a 
question of jurisdiction,”102 and he judges the conclusion of Max Stackhouse to be apt: 
when religion “is doing its own thing,” it is off limits.103  The government exceeds its 
jurisdiction as limited by the Establishment Clause when it attempts to regulate matters 
“in the exclusive sphere of religion”104 or matters that are “inherently religious.”105  
Esbeck points to several Supreme Court cases to illustrate what he means by these terms.  
In Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor,106 for example, the Court 
held that application of the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act to the ordinary 
commercial activities of a religious organization did not violate the Religion Clauses of 
the First Amendment.107  Because the Act’s requirements “apply only to commercial 
activities undertaken with a ‘business purpose,’” they have “no impact on [the religious 
organization’s] own evangelical activities or on individuals engaged in volunteer work 
                                                 
99 Esbeck, Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint, supra note __, at 68. 
100 Id. at 109 
101 Id. at 68. 
102 Esbeck, Differentiating the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, 42 J. CHURCH & ST. 311, 325 
(2000) 
103 Id. 
104 Esbeck, Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint, supra note __, at 78. 
105 Id. at 79. 
106 471 U.S. 290 (1985). 
107 471 U.S. at 305-06. 
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for other religious organizations.”108  The recordkeeping requirements of the Act, like 
“such secular governmental activity” as fire inspections and building regulations, did not 
unconstitutionally intrude into religious affairs.  Insofar as it seeks to regulate the wages 
of employees involved in the ordinary commercial activities of a religious entity, the 
FLSA is legislation operating within the civil government’s proper sphere of action; it 
does not invade the protected religious sphere.109   
In contrast, when the government sponsors prayer in schools and religious 
displays in government buildings, it has improperly entered the realm of the exclusively 
religious.  Thus, Esbeck suggests that cases like Lee v. Weisman,110 where the Court held 
that inviting clergy to offer prayers at graduation ceremonies for public middle schools 
and high schools violated the Establishment Clause, and County of Allegheny v. ACLU 
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,111 where the Court held that a crèche displayed on the 
Grand Staircase of the county courthouse violated the Establishment Clause, can both be 
understood as “structural determinations that government exceeded its power by 
involving itself in a matter beyond its authority.”112
 Deciding where to draw the line between the sphere of governmental competence 
and the sphere of religious competence where government is not sovereign has been a 
                                                 
108 471 U.S. at 305. 
109 Esbeck, Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint, supra note __, at 79.  Cf. NLRB v. Catholic 
Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 593-94 (1979) (because of the unique mission-sensitive role played by 
teachers in a church-operated school, “serious First Amendment questions” would follow from the NLRB’s 
exercise of jurisdiction over teachers in such schools).  The Court in Catholic Bishop avoided deciding the 
constitutional question by assuming, in the absence of clear intent to the contrary, the Congress intended to 
exempt church-operated schools from regulation under the NLRA.  440 U.S. at 504-07.  Esbeck argues that 
under the structural Establishment Clause, the outcome would be the same, “but with ecclesiastical 
autonomy protected without any timidity in stating that such a result is required by the Establishment 
Clause.”  Esbeck, Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint, supra note __, at 79. 
110 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
111 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
112 Esbeck, Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint, supra note __, at 98 n. 421 
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contentious task for 2,000 years.113  It would, Esbeck argues, “be naïve to suppose that 
there is an easy formula for determining ‘what is Caesar’s and what is God’s.’”114  At the 
same time, however, Esbeck warns against exaggerating the difficulty involved in 
drawing the line.115  Paying attention to what the Supreme Court has decided in its 
Establishment Clause cases “indicates that government does not exceed the restraints of 
the Establishment Clause unless it is acting on topics that are ‘inherently religious.’”  
Examples of such topics include prayer, devotional bible reading, veneration of the Ten 
Commandments, classes in confessional religion, and the biblical narrative of creation 
taught as science.  These topics are “off limits” as objects of purposeful governmental 
action.  In contrast, subject matters that are not “inherently religious” are legitimate 
objects for governmental action, even when the governmental action reflects a moral 
judgment about the social good that might coincide with the theological judgment of 
some religions.   
Governmental action that would “involve government in the ‘essentially religious 
activities’ of religious institutions” would cross the line into the sphere of the inherently 
religious.116  In contrast, “where the contested governmental activity is calculated to 
achieve nonreligious purposes otherwise within the competence of the State, and where 
the activity does not involve the State so significantly and directly in the realm of the 
sectarian,” then the government has not crossed the boundary into the exclusive realm of 
                                                 
113 See MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS, supra note __, at 64 (“The distinction [between the spiritual 
and temporal orders] had always been difficult to maintain in practice, even when it was affirmed in 
theory.”). 
114 Esbeck, Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint, supra note __, at 104-05. 
115 Id. 
116 Esbeck, Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint, supra note __, at 108 (quoting Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 658 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
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religion.117  Esbeck contends that “inherently religious” activities are “those exclusively 
religious activities of worship and the propagation or inculcation of the sort of tenets that 
comprise confessional statements or creeds common to many religions.”118  The term 
“inherently religious” also embraces the supernatural claims of religious communities 
“around which religion (religare) identifies and defines itself, conducts its collective 
worship, divines and teaches doctrine, and propagates the faith to children and adult 
converts.”  These matters fall under the exclusive sovereignty of religion; they are 
beyond the jurisdiction of government.119
The selection of ministers would seem to fall squarely within the sphere of 
exclusive religious sovereignty, and the ministerial exception seems, therefore to rest 
upon a firm constitutional foundation under Esbeck’s structural/jurisdictional theory of 
the Establishment Clause.  The selection of ministers is an activity that implicates the 
supernatural claims of religious communities, claims around which a religion identifies 
and defines itself, conducts its worship, develops and teaches doctrine, and propagates 
the faith.  In this sense, the selection of ministers is an inherently religious activity that 
falls within the exclusive competence of religion. 
IV.  THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION, SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION,  
AND THE FREEDOM OF THE CHURCH 
 
The prevailing understanding of what the ministerial exception means and how it 
operates leads to the conclusion that the exception should be characterized as a subject 
matter jurisdiction defense, not as a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s 
claim.  Unlike the Third Circuit in Petruska, most courts do understand the ministerial 
                                                 
117 Id. (quoting Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
118 Esbeck, Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint, supra note __, at 109. 
119 Id.  
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exception as a constitutionally mandated limitation on a court’s power to hear a particular 
category of cases brought against religious employers.120  Subject matter jurisdiction 
concerns “the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate [a] case,”121 and the 
label “jurisdictional” properly applies to “prescriptions delineating the classes of cases … 
falling within a court’s adjudicatory power.”122  As a constitutional limitation which 
removes a class of cases from the courts’ adjudicatory power, the ministerial exception is 
best understood as giving rise to a subject matter jurisdiction objection.  In other words, 
the First Amendment denies courts the authority to adjudicate a particular type of legal 
controversy – claims that seek to impose secular standards on a religious institution’s 
employment of its ministers.123  Thus, civil courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over 
such claims. 
A. The Difference Between Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim  
The Third Circuit’s confusion regarding the distinction between a subject matter 
jurisdiction defense and the defense of failure to state a claim is not unique.  As the 
Supreme Court noted in a recent Title VII case, Arbaugh v. Y & H Corporation,124 courts 
often confuse or conflate two concepts that must be distinguished: “federal-court subject-
                                                 
120 See note __ supra (citing cases). 
121 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998); id. at 94 (“‘Without jurisdiction 
the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.  Jurisdiction is the power to declare the law, and when it ceases 
to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.’” 
(quoting Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1868)). 
122 Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004); see also Rweyemamu v. Commission on Human Rights 
and Opportunities, 2006 WL 3511771, *1 (Conn. App. 2006) (“‘Jurisdiction of the subject-matter is the 
power of [the court] to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question 
belong. … A court has subject matter jurisdiction if it has the authority to adjudicate a particular type of 
legal controversy.’”) (quoting Figueroa v. C & S Ball Bearing, 675 A.2d 845, 847 (Conn. 1996)); id. at *4 
(“The ministerial exception prevents courts or government agencies from exercising jurisdiction over a 
religious institution’s actions regarding the employment of its ministers.”) . 
123 See EEOC v. Catholic University of America, 83 F.3d 455, 467 (DC Cir. 1996) (the ministerial 
exception is “judicial shorthand” for the conclusion that “the imposition of secular standards on a church’s 
employment of its ministers will burden the free exercise of religion”). 
124 126 S. Ct. 1253 (2006). 
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matter jurisdiction over a controversy; and the essential elements of a federal claim for 
relief.”125  The Court in Arbaugh held that the statutory employee-numerosity 
requirement for establishing employer status under Title VII was not a matter of subject 
matter jurisdiction.  Instead, that numerosity requirement was an element of the plaintiff’s 
claim for relief, and thus was properly raised in a 12(b)(6) objection (which cannot be 
raised after trial), rather than as 12(b)(1) objection (which, pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3), can 
be raised at any time).126
The Arbaugh Court explained that, “[o]n the subject-matter 
jurisdiction/ingredient-of-claim-for-relief dichotomy, this Court and others have been less 
than meticulous.  Subject-matter jurisdiction in federal cases is sometimes erroneously 
conflated with a plaintiff’s need and ability to prove the defendant bound by the federal 
law asserted as a predicate for relief – a merits-related determination.”127  Because Title 
VII actions are civil actions arising under the laws of the United States, subject matter 
jurisdiction in the case before the Court in Arbaugh existed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.128  Subject matter jurisdiction “involves the court’s power to hear a case,”129 and 
§ 1331 gave the court the power to hear this Title VII case.130  Whether Y & H 
Corporation employed enough people to be bound by the prohibitions of Title VII was a 
question of the merits, an element of the plaintiffs claim, not a matter of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  If the employer does not employee the statutorily required number of 
employees, the employer is not bound to comply with Title VII and the plaintiff is not 
                                                 
125 126 S. Ct., at 1238. 
126 Id. 
127 126 S. Ct., at 1242. 
128 126 S. Ct. at 1238. 
129 126 S. Ct. at 1244. 
130 Id. (“A plaintiff properly invokes §1331 jurisdiction when she pleads a colorable claim arising under the 
Constitution or laws of the United States.”).  
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entitled to any relief under the statute.  A court has the power to hear such a case, but it 
lacks power under the statute to provide the plaintiff with any relief, because the plaintiff 
is unable to establish one of the essential predicates for obtaining relief. 
At first blush, the Court’s analysis in Arbaugh would seem to validate the Third 
Circuit’s approach to the ministerial exception defense in Petruska.  The Petruska court 
reasoned that it had the power to hear Petruska’s case, because she had raised a claim 
arising under federal law.  The ministerial exception defense, in the court’s view, did not 
go “‘the court’s very power to hear the case.’”131  Instead, the exception allows the 
defendant to argue that “the First Amendment bars Petruska’s claims.…The exception 
may serve as a barrier to the success of a plaintiff’s claims, but it does not affect the 
court’s authority to consider them.”132  Section 1331 allows the court to hear Petruska’s 
claim, but the First Amendment bars the court from providing her with any relief under 
Title VII.  Thus, the Third Circuit concluded, the ministerial exception gives rise to a 
12(b)(6) objection, not a 12(b)(1) objection. 
Yet the reason why the plaintiff’s claim is barred in Petruska makes that case 
quite different from the case before the Court in Arbaugh.  In Arbaugh, the question 
boiled down to this: is the plaintiff entitled to relief under the terms of the statute that the 
plaintiff has asserted as the predicate for relief?  If the defendant employs the requisite 
number of employees, Title VII applies, and the plaintiff can state a claim for relief under 
the statute.  In Petruska, in contrast, the plaintiff would seem to be able to state a claim 
establishing all the essential elements for relief under Title VII.  As the Fourth Circuit 
                                                 
131 462 F.3d at 302. 
132 462 F.3d at 302-03. 
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explained in Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists,133 while Title 
VII does allow religious organizations to take religion into account in hiring, the statute 
does not authorize religious organizations to make ministerial hiring decisions on the 
basis of race or sex.134  Instead, both the text and history of the statute led the court “to 
conclude that, Title VII, by ‘the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed,’ 
applies to [ministerial] employment decision[s].”135  Moreover, the Petruska court 
explicitly referenced Rayburn in its discussion of the jurisdictional question: “We agree 
with the Fourth Circuit that Congress intended Title VII to apply to cases involving 
sexual discrimination and retaliation by religious institutions.  We must therefore reach 
the constitutional question – i.e., whether application of Title VII to a ministerial 
employment relationship violates the First Amendment.”136  This constitutional question, 
however, would seem to lead back to the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.  The First 
Amendment bars relief in ministerial exception cases precisely because courts lack the 
“very power” to hear the employment discrimination cases brought by ministerial 
employees.  Courts cannot hear and decide such cases without violating the First 
Amendment.  In other words, the First Amendment removes such cases from the 
adjudicatory power of the courts. 
B. The Ministerial Exception as a Limitation on Adjudicatory Power  
A careful reading of the cases that provide the foundation for the ministerial 
exception reveals that the exception should be understood as a matter of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  In the first case to recognize the ministerial exception, McClure v. Salvation 
                                                 
133 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985). 
134 772 F.2d at 1166. 
135 772 F.2d at 1167 (quoting NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979)). 
136 462 F.3d at 304 n.4. 
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Army,137 the Fifth Circuit characterized the exception in jurisdictional terms.138  Billie B. 
McClure brought a Title VII sex discrimination action against the Salvation Army, after 
the Salvation Army terminated her status as an officer.  She alleged that she had received 
a lower salary and fewer benefits than similarly situated male officers and that she had 
been discharged because of her complaints about that adverse treatment to her superiors 
and to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.139  Mrs. McClure conceded that 
the Salvation Army should be considered a religion and that, as an officer, she was a 
minister “engaged in the religious or ecclesiastical activities of the church.”140  At the 
same time, she argued that the Salvation Army was not exempt from prohibition of sex 
discrimination in employment established by Title VII.141    
Section 702 of Title VII does allow religious organizations to take religion into 
account when hiring employees to perform work connected to the organization’s 
religious activities.142  The text of the statute does not, however, exempt religious 
employers from complying with its prohibitions of discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, sex, or national origin, and efforts to exempt religious organizations entirely from 
compliance with Title VII were rejected by Congress.  Thus, the Fifth Circuit, explained, 
“[t]he language and legislative history of § 702 compel the conclusion that Congress did 
not intend that a religious organization  be exempted from liability for discriminating 
                                                 
137 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972). 
138 460 F.2d at 560 (affirming the district court’s order “sustaining the Salvation Army’s motion to dismiss 
the complaint for want of jurisdiction”). 
139 460 F.2d at 555. 
140 460 F.2d at 556. 
141 460 F.2d at 556. 
142 Section 702 of Title VII provides: 
 This subchapter shall not apply . . . to a religious corporation, association, educational institution,  
or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work 
connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society 
of its activities. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (emphasis added). 
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against its employees on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin with respect to 
their compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment.”143
Having reached this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit had to face this constitutional 
question: can Title VII be applied to the employment relationship between a church and 
its minister without violating the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment?  The court 
began by explaining that, under then-prevailing Free Exercise doctrine, the government 
must establish a compelling interest in support of “state action which imposes even an 
‘incidental burden’ on the free exercise of religion.”  Indeed, “in this highly sensitive 
constitutional area ‘[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give 
occasion for permissible limitation.’”144  The court then focused attention on the critical 
nature of the church-minister relationship that would be threatened by the application of 
Title VII in this case: 
The relationship between an organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood.  
The minister is the chief instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its 
purpose.  Matters touching this relationship must necessarily be recognized as of 
prime ecclesiastical concern.  Just as the initial function of selecting a minister is 
a matter of church administration and government, so are the functions which 
accompany such a selection.  It is unavoidably true that these include the 
determination of a minister’s salary, his place of assignment, and the duty he is to 
perform in the furtherance of the religious mission of the church.145
 
Characterizing the terms of employment between a church and its ministers as “a matter 
of church administration and government” allowed the Fifth Circuit to connect Mrs. 
McClure’s Title VII action to a series of Supreme Court precedents that had described the 
boundary between governmental authority and church authority in jurisdictional terms.  
                                                 
143 460 F.2d at 558. 
144 460 F.2d at 558 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)). 
145 460 F.2d at 558-59. 
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The court explained that, beginning with its opinion in Watson v. Jones,146 “the Supreme 
Court began to place matters of church government and administration beyond the 
purview of civil authorities.”147  Watson involved a church property dispute between rival 
factions of the Presbyterian Church.  The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed a state court 
ruling which held that the civil courts were bound by the decision reached on the matter 
by the highest ecclesiastical governing body of the Presbyterian Church.  At the time of 
the Watson decision, the First Amendment had not yet been held applicable to the 
states,148 but the Court understood the principle governing its decision as a component of 
the American commitment to religious freedom: 
In this class of cases we think the rule of action which should govern the civil 
courts, founded in a broad and sound view of the relations of church and state 
under our system of laws, and supported by a preponderating weight of judicial 
authority is, that, whenever the question of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical 
rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories 
to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept these 
decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before 
them.149
 
The Court recognized that judicial practice in England had been different, but “the 
full, entire, and practical freedom for all forms of religious belief and practice which lies 
at the foundation of our political principles”150 demanded that the civil courts stay out of 
internal matters of church governance: 
The right to organize voluntary religious associations and to assist in the 
expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for 
the decision of controverted questions of faith within the association, and for the 
ecclesiastical government of all the individual members, congregations, and 
officers within the general association, is unquestioned.  All who unite themselves 
                                                 
146 80 U.S. 679 (1871). 
147 460 F.2d at 559. 
148 Watson was a diversity case decided on the basis of general federal common law in the era prior to Erie 
R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
149 80 U.S. at 727 
150 80 U.S. at 728. 
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to such a body do so with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to 
submit to it.  But it would be a vain consent and would to the total subversion of 
religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the 
secular courts and have them reversed.  It is of the essence of these religious 
unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising 
among themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all cases of 
ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organism itself 
provides for.151
 
Eighty years later, in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral,152 another church 
property dispute gave the Supreme Court the opportunity to tie the principle articulated in 
Watson to the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.153  In Kedroff, the Court 
struck down a New York statute that purported to transfer administrative control of the 
Russian Orthodox churches in North America from the Patriarch in Moscow to church 
authorities selected by a convention of Russian Orthodox groups in North America.  
Under the statute, the bishop appointed by the Patriarch in Moscow was denied access to 
the St. Nicholas Cathedral in New York.  In holding that the New York statute was an 
unconstitutional burden on the free exercise of religion, the Court drew on its prior 
opinion in Watson.  While Watson itself had not been decided under the free exercise 
clause, 
the opinion radiate[d] … a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an 
independence from secular control or manipulation, in short, power to decide for 
themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as 
those of faith and doctrine.  Freedom to select the clergy … we think, must now 
be said to have federal constitutional protection as a part of the free exercise of 
religion against state interference.154
 
                                                 
151 80 U.S. at 728-29. 
152 344 U.S. 94 (1952) 
153 344 U.S. at 115-16 (noting that Watson had been decided “before judicial recognition of the coercive 
power of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the limitations of the First Amendment against state 
action”). 
154 344 U.S. at 154-55. 
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 In light of Watson and Kedroff, the Fifth Circuit in McClure concluded that Title 
VII could not be applied to the employment relationship between Mrs. McClure and the 
Salvation Army without violating the First Amendment.  The court explained that the 
issues raised by Mrs. McClure’s employment discrimination claim – whether decisions 
made by the Salvation Army regarding her ministerial assignment, salary, and duties 
violated Title VII – were “matters of church administration and government and thus, 
purely of ecclesiastical cognizance.”155  Adjudication of her claim would involve 
investigation and review of ecclesiastical practices and decisions and “would, as a result, 
cause the State to intrude upon matters of church administration and government which 
have so many times before been proclaimed to be matters of a singular ecclesiastical 
concern.”  This might easily and improperly allow control of “strictly ecclesiastical 
matters” to “pass from the church to the State,” depriving the church of the power to 
decide for itself matters of church administration and governance.156  Finally, the 
investigation and review involved in adjudicating a minister’s employment 
discrimination claim “could only produce by its coercive effect the very opposite of the 
separation of church and State contemplated by the First Amendment.” 
 In short, allowing Mrs. McClure’s employment discrimination claim to proceed 
“would result in an encroachment by the State into an area of religious freedom which it 
is forbidden to enter by the principles of the free exercise clause of the First 
Amendment.”  The court, however, backed away from holding that the case involved a 
conflict between a clearly applicable federal statute and a constitutional prohibition in 
which the statute must give way.  The analysis up to this point seemed to demand that the 
                                                 
155 460 F.2d at 560. 
156 Id. 
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court hold that First Amendment prevented application of Title VII in this case.  Yet, in 
the last paragraph of the opinion, the McClure court abruptly chose to frame its holding 
in terms of constitutional avoidance.157  “We …hold that Congress did not intend, 
through the nonspecific wording of the applicable provisions of Title VII, to regulate the 
employment relationship between church and minister.”158  On this basis, the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for want of jurisdiction.159
 Because of this avoidance strategy, the court’s actual holding might, in fact, be 
better understood as affirming dismissal of the action for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted, rather than for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The court 
interprets the statute itself not to apply to the church-minister relationship; in other words, 
the statute fails to create a cause of action that would allow the minister to obtain relief 
for employment discrimination against her church employer.  Yet the more plausible 
reading of Title VII, as the court itself recognized earlier in its opinion, “compel[s] the 
conclusion that Congress did not intend”160 to exempt religious organizations from 
liability for discriminating on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin.  If 
ministerial claims are to be excluded, it must be because the Religion Clauses of the 
Constitution bar the federal government and the states from interfering with matters of 
purely ecclesiastical cognizance like the employment relationship between a church and 
its ministers.  The government cannot regulate the relationship and the courts cannot 
adjudicate claims that implicate the relationship.  Thus, the First Amendment removes 
                                                 
157 “‘[I]f a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first 
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.’” 
460 F.2d at 560 (quoting Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, 
J., concurring)). 
158 460 F.2d at 560-61; see also Schleicher, 2008 WL 516892, at *2 (characterizing the ministerial 
exception as an interpretive rule, not a constitutional rule). 
159 460 F.2d at 561. 
160 460 F.2d at 558 (emphasis added). 
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disputes regarding church governance and administration from the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the civil courts, federal or state. 
 The Fourth Circuit adopted the more plausible reading of Title VII and addressed 
the constitutional issue head-on in Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day 
Adventists.161  In Rayburn, the court held that the First Amendment barred a woman 
denied a pastoral position in the Seventh-Day Adventist Church from raising a Title VII 
sex and race discrimination claim against the Church.  Unlike the Fifth Circuit in 
McClure, the Rayburn court concluded that it could not “impose upon a statute a limiting 
construction where to do so would strain congressional intent.”  Here, the “language and 
legislative history of Title VII both indicate that the statute exempts religious institutions 
only to a narrow extent.”  Thus, Ms. Rayburn’s claim produced a collision between Title 
VII and the First Amendment that the court could not avoid. 
 The Fourth Circuit in Rayburn was able to draw on an additional precedent in the 
Supreme Court’s Watson-Kedroff line of church autonomy cases.  In Serbian Eastern 
Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,162 decided four years after McClure, the Court held 
that the Illinois Supreme Court violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments by issuing 
a decision that invalidated a reorganization plan adopted by the American-Canadian 
Diocese of the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church.  The case arose after the Holy 
Assembly of Bishops and Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church (the Mother 
Church) removed Dionisije Milivojevich as bishop of the American-Canadian diocese. 
The removal followed Milivojevich’s refusal to accept the reorganization plan adopted by 
                                                 
161 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985).  The Seventh Circuit’s recent reversion to the interpretive rule 
understanding of the ministerial exception, see Schliecher, 2008 WL 516892, at *2, makes no reference to 
the Fourth Circuit’s analysis in Rayburn.   
162 426 U.S. 696 (1976). 
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the Holy Assemby and refused to turn administration of the Diocese over to a new bishop 
appointed by the Holy Assembly.163  Milivojevich sought an injunction in Illinois state 
court to prevent the Mother Church from interfering with diocesan assets and to have 
himself declared the true Diocesan Bishop.164  The Illinois Supreme Court ultimately 
held that Milivojevich’s removal had to be set aside as “‘arbitrary,” because the removal 
was “not conducted according to the Illinois Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Church’s constitution and penal code.”165  The court further held that “the Diocesan 
reorganization was invalid because it was beyond the scope of the Mother Church’s 
authority to effectuate such changes without Diocesan approval.”166  
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.  The Court explained that “[t]he fallacy fatal to 
the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court” was that court’s “impermissible rejection of 
the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunals” of the hierarchical Mother Church on 
the disputed issues.167  The Illinois court “impermissibly substitute[d] its own inquiry 
into church polity” in resolving the dispute between Milivojevich and the Mother 
Church.168  Allowing civil courts to “‘probe deeply enough into the allocation of power’” 
within a hierarchical church to allow it do decide disputes regarding church polity and 
administration violates the First Amendment “‘in much the same manner as civil 
determination of religious doctrine.’”169  When civil courts try to decide such disputes, 
                                                 
163 426 U.S. at 703-05. 
164 426 U.S. at 707-08. 
165 426 U.S. at 708. 
166 Id. 
167 Id.  
168 Id. 
169 426 U.S. at 709 (quoting Md. & Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. 367, 369 (1970) 
(Brennan, J., concurring)). 
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“‘the hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free development of religious doctrine and 
of implicating secular interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern.’”170
Drawing on the principles first articulated in Watson, the Court explained that any 
inquiry into whether a church’s decisions complied with its own church laws and 
regulations violated “the constitutional mandate that civil courts are bound to accept the 
decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious organization of hierarchical polity on 
matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or 
law.”171    The Court’s precedents established a “general rule that religious controversies 
are not the proper subject of civil court inquiry, and … a civil court must accept the 
ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals as it finds them.”172  By ordering 
Milivojevich’s reinstatement as a bishop, even though the Mother Church considered him 
to be a schismatic, the Illinois Supreme Court had “unconstitutionally undertaken the 
resolution of quintessentially religious controversies whose resolution the First 
Amendment commits exclusively to the highest ecclesiastical tribunals” of the Mother 
Church.173  The diocesan reorganization undertaken by the Mother Church was a matter 
of “internal church governance, an issue at the core of ecclesiastical affairs,” and, as the 
U.S. Supreme Court said in Kedroff, “‘religious freedom encompasses the ‘power [of 
religious bodies] to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church 
government, as well as those of faith and doctrine.’”174   
The protection for church autonomy established by the Supreme Court in the 
Watson-Kedroff-Milivojevich line of cases led the Fourth Circuit in Rayburn to conclude 
                                                 
170 426 U.S. at 711 (quoting Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969)). 
171 426 U.S. at 713. 
172 Id.   
173 426 U.S. at 720. 
174 426 U.S. at 721-22 (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)). 
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that adjudicating Ms. Rayburn’s employment discrimination claim was prohibited by the 
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.  A church’s free exercise rights are burdened 
by any attempt “to restrict a church’s free choice of its leaders.”  This is a substantial 
burden on religious freedom, because “[t]he right to choose ministers without 
government restriction underlies the well-being of religious community.”175  Indeed, 
“perpetuation of a church’s existence may depend upon those whom it selects to preach 
its values, teach its message, and interpret its doctrines both to its own membership and 
to the world at large.”176  While the elimination of employment discrimination is an 
interest whose magnitude is “difficult to exaggerate,”177 introducing government 
standards into the selection of ministers is a burden that is too substantial to permit: it 
“would significantly, and perniciously, rearrange the relationship between church and 
state.” 
In order to maintain the constitutionally mandated relationship between church 
and state, churches must possess “the unfettered right … to resolve certain questions.”178  
Therefore, “[i]n ‘quintessentially religious’ matters, the free exercise clause protects the 
act of a decision rather than a motivation behind it.  In these sensitive areas, the state may 
no more require a minimum basis in doctrinal reasoning than it may supervise doctrinal 
content.”179  The question of who is to serve as a minister is one of those quintessentially 
religious matters that the Constitution places beyond the legitimate authority of the state. 
                                                 
175 772 F.2d at 1167. 
176 772 F.2d at 1168. 
177 772 F.2d at 1168; see also 772 F.2d at 1169 (“As Title VII is an interest of the highest order, courts have 
held that Title VII properly applied to the secular employment decisions of a religious institution …. But 
court must distinguish incidental burdens on free exercise in the service of a compelling state interest from 
burdens where ‘the inroad on religious liberty’ is too substantial to be permissible.”).  
178 772 F.2d at 1169. 
179 772 F.2d at 1169 (quoting Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 720). 
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The Fourth Circuit also explained that subjecting a church’s ministerial choices to 
Title VII scrutiny would violate the establishment clause by “giv[ing] rise to ‘excessive 
governmental entanglement’ with religious institutions.”  The establishment clause 
operates to keep government out of the sphere reserved to religion: 
Bureaucratic suggestion in employment decisions of a pastoral character, in 
contravention of a church’s own perception of its needs and purposes, would 
constitute unprecedented entanglement with religious authority and compromise 
the premise “that both religion and government can work best to achieve their 
lofty aims if each is left free of the other within its respective sphere.”180  
 
Yet, to affirm that the church has freedom in the religious sphere is not to claim 
for the church complete freedom from the law: 
Of course churches are not – and should not be – above the law.  Like any other 
person or organization, they may be held liable for their torts and upon their valid 
contracts.  Their employment decisions may be subject to Title VII scrutiny, 
where the decision does not involve the church’s spiritual functions.181
 
The case of a ministerial employment decision, however, is different.  Such a decision 
does involve the church’s spiritual functions, and thus, the Constitution does place the 
decision beyond the reach of the law.  With respect to the question of who a church 
selects to serve as its minister, “the Constitution requires that civil authorities decline to 
review either the procedures for selection or the qualifications of those selected or 
rejected.”182  To say that the Constitution requires civil authorities to “decline to review” 
a particular class of cases seems to be another way of saying that the Constitution 
removes that class of cases from the subject matter jurisdiction of the civil courts. 
C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Characteristics of the Ministerial Exception 
                                                 
180 772 F.2d at 1171 (quoting MCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948)). 
181 772 F.2d at 1171. 
182 Id. 
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The case of Bell v. Presbyterian Church183 provides a clear example of the way in 
which this jurisdictional bar operates – even when the federal jurisdictional statutes 
provide a textual basis for the exercise of federal jurisdiction.  James M. Bell was an 
ordained minister who was called by Interfaith Impact to serve as its executive 
director.184  Four national religious organizations (including the Presbyterian Church, 
U.S.A.) created and funded Interfaith Impact, which was a non-profit corporation whose 
mission was “to advance the jointly shared religious purposes of its members, namely, to 
carry out their theological imperative to increase the possibilities for peace, economic and 
social justice.”185  In the engagement letter that outlined the terms of Rev. Bell’s service, 
Interfaith noted that this service “would be an extension of his ministry” as an ordained 
minister in the United Church of Christ.  Three years after Rev. Bell began his service 
with Interfaith, a financial crisis in the organization arose, and the Presbyterian Church 
decided not to allocate any funds to Interfaith for the coming year.  This led Interfaith’s 
board of directors decided to continue Interfaith’s ministry with a volunteer staff, and it 
terminated Rev. Bell’s service as executive director as part of a complete reduction in 
force.186
 Bell then filed suit against the principal contributing religious organizations.  His 
complaint alleged a number of state-law tort and contract claims in an effort to challenge 
the defendants’ “expressed reason for ending the program and terminating his 
employment.”187  The action was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District 
of Virginia, and the complaint invoked diversity of citizenship as the basis for federal 
                                                 
183 126 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 1997). 
184 126 F.3d at 330. 
185 126 F.3d at 329. 
186 126 F.3d at 330. 
187 126 F.3d at 330. 
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jurisdiction.188  While the defendants did not contest the existence of diversity of 
citizenship,189 the district court granted the defendants’ 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the “‘essential core of the case’ 
involved the Churches’ decisions to allocate their funds as they saw fit.”190  Because 
“Rev. Bell’s lawsuit intruded over internal church matters over which civil courts do not 
have subject matter jurisdiction,” the court dismissed the action with prejudice.191
 The Fourth Circuit affirmed.  Drawing on Watson, Kedroff, and Milivojevich, the 
court explained that “civil courts have long taken care not to intermeddle in internal 
ecclesiastical disputes.”192  “In keeping with the First Amendment’s” protection of 
religious freedom,193 it has “become established that the decisions of religious entities 
about the appointment and removal of ministers and persons in other positions of similar 
theological significance are beyond the ken of civil courts.”194  The court, therefore, 
articulated the key question in the case in this way: was the lawsuit between Rev. Bell 
and the four national churches an ecclesiastical dispute about “‘discipline, faith, internal 
organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom or law,’”195 or, was this “a case in which we 
should hold religious organizations liable in civil courts for ‘purely secular disputes 
                                                 
188 See Bell v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellant James M. Bell, 1996 WL 
33453752 (4th Cir.), at *v (noting that jurisdiction in the action against the corporate defendants was based 
on 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)). 
189 Id. 
190 Bell v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), Brief for the Appellees, 1996 WL 33453754 (4th Cir.) (Statement 
of the Case). 
191 Id. 
192 126 F.3d at 330; see also 126 F.3d at 330-31 (discussing Watson, Kedroff, and Milivojevich). 
193 126 F.3d at 330. 
194 126 F.3d at 331. 
195 Id. (quoting Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713). 
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between third parties and a particular defendant, albeit a religiously affiliated 
organization’”?196             
The court concluded that the lawsuit was best characterized as an ecclesiastical 
dispute.  While the complaint was framed in terms of tort and contract claims, Bell’s 
allegations, “[a]t bottom, … focuse[d] on how the constituent churches spen[t] their 
religious outreach funds.”197  Judicial resolution of that question would “interpose the 
judiciary” into decisions at the heart of how the defendant churches governed their 
spiritual mission, decisions “relating to how and by whom they spread their message and 
specifically their decision to select their outreach ministry through the granting or 
withholding of funds.”198  These decisions “about the nature, extent, administration, and 
termination of a religious ministry fall[ ] within the ecclesiastical sphere the First 
Amendment protects from civil court intervention.”199  Accordingly, even though the 
diversity statute purported to authorize federal jurisdiction over Rev. Bell’s lawsuit, the 
court concluded that his claim fell with the category of cases that the First Amendment 
removes from the subject matter jurisdiction of the civil courts.   
 Unlike the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the 
issue of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any point in the course of judicial 
proceedings,200 and the subject matter jurisdiction issue can be raised by the court sua 
                                                 
196 Id. (quoting General Council on Finance and Administration of the United Methodist Church v. 
California Superior Court, 439 U.S. 1369, 1373 (1978) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice)). 
197 126 F.3d at 332. 
198 Id. 
199 126 F.3d at 333. 
200 Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that 
the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.”) with FED. R. CIV. P. 
12(h)(2) (“A defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted . . . may be made in any 
pleading permitted or ordered under Rule 7(a), or by motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial 
on the merits.”) 
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sponte.201  Judge Oberdorfer of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
treated the ministerial exception in just this way in Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission v. Catholic University of America.202  The case was brought by the EEOC 
and Sister Elizabeth McDonough, who alleged that Catholic University had engaged in 
sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII when it denied Sister 
McDonough’s application for tenure in the university’s Department of Canon Law. 
 After the trial concluded, and the parties had submitted proposed findings and 
conclusions in the case, Judge Oberdorfer requested that the parties file briefs 
“addressing the question [of] whether the First Amendment precludes maintenance and 
adjudication of Sister McDonough’s claims.203  The judge had begun to question his 
constitutional authority to hear the case in the midst of the trial, because much of the 
testimony concerned the quality of Sister McDonough’s canon law scholarship, 
especially as compared to the work of the two most recent applicants for tenure in the 
department, both of whom were men.  This caused Judge Oberdorfer to express “his 
uneasiness at ‘sitting on the qualifications of an expert in canon law’” and to suggest that 
“the line of inquiry was getting awful[ly] close to entangling the government and the 
judiciary in religious matters.’”204  After hearing post-trial oral argument on the 
                                                 
201 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (the appearance of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised “by 
suggestion of the parties or otherwise”).  
202 856 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1994), aff’d, 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. 
Tuttle, The Faith-Based Initiative and the Constitution, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 34 n.162 (2005) (“Because 
the limitations [of the ministerial exception], born of both Establishment and Free Exercise considerations, 
go to subject matter jurisdiction of the civil courts, judges can and do raise them sua sponte.”); id. (noting 
that court of appeals in Catholic University “approv[ed] of the district court’s refusal to proceed with 
adjudication of [the plaintiffs’ Title VII claim against] Catholic University, despite the parties’ willingness 
to proceed on the merits”). 
203 856 F. Supp. at 2. 
204 83 F.3d at 459 (quoting Nov. 4, 1993 Trial Transcript at 9-10); see also id. (“‘I’ve got to pass on 
people’s judgment about colleagues in a religious setting … and when I hear this … aggressive 
examination of a priest about what is at least partly his clerical duties, I’ve got a problem.’”) (quoting Nov. 
5, 1993 Trial Transcript at 147). 
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constitutional question, the judge concluded that Sister McDonough’s role in the Canon 
Law department required her to be characterized as a ministerial employee of a religious 
institution.  Accordingly, applying Title VII to the facts and relationships in her case 
“would violate both the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses by entangling 
government in a primarily religious function and relationship,”205 and the district court 
dismissed the case without reaching the merits206  Both the court’s sua sponte 
introduction of the First Amendment question after trial207 and the court’s conclusion 
that it was without constitutional authority to decide the action on the merits demonstrate 
that the court understood the ministerial exception to be an issue of subject matter 
jurisdiction, rather than a matter of the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claim.208  
These cases support the conclusion reached by the district court in Petruska:  “the 
ministerial exception partakes of jurisdictional qualities, as it implicates constitutionally 
mandated restraints on [a court’s] power to adjudicate certain types of employment 
disputes.”209  This sort of “constitutionally compelled limitation on civil authority”210 
with respect to particular category of disputes – particular subject matter – is best 
described as a limitation on court’s subject matter jurisdiction.  The limitation on the 
                                                 
205 856 F. Supp. at 9. 
206 83 F.3d at 460.  Judge Oberdorfer explained that the investigation and proceeding “ha[d] impermissibly 
entangled the civil authorities in religious decision-making.”  Such entanglement impairs “a religious 
institution’s choice of those who teach its doctrine and participate in church governance.  Therefore, the 
religion clauses of the First Amendment preclude decision of this Title VII action on its merits.” 856 F. 
Supp. at 13. 
207 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3). 
208 See 2 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.34[6][a] (3d ed. 2005) (“A dismissal for failure to state a claim 
is a judgment on the merits, unlike dismissals for lack of subject matter or personal jurisdiction . . . .”); see 
also Kirkham v. Societe Air France, 429 F.3d 288, 291 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (a court can render a decision on 
the merits “only after jurisdiction has been established”); Winslow v. Walters, 815 F.2d 1114, 1116 (7th Cir. 
1987) (“Seeking summary judgment on a jurisdictional issue … is the equivalent of asking a court to hold 
that because it has no jurisdiction the plaintiff has lost on the merits.  This is a nonsequitur.”). 
209 Petruska v. Gannon University, 350 F. Supp.2d 666, 682 (W.D. Pa. 2004), aff’d in part on other 
grounds, 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2098 (2007). 
210 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 800 
(4th Cir. 2000). 
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scope of civil jurisdiction manifest in the ministerial exception “ensures that no branch of 
secular government trespasses on the most spiritually intimate grounds of a religious 
community’s existence.”211  As the Seventh Circuit explained in Tomic v. Catholic 
Diocese of Peoria,212 the court explained that courts are “secular agencies” that do not 
possess the power to “exercise jurisdiction over the internal affairs of religious 
organizations.”213  Intra-ecclesial doctrinal disputes “ha[ve] never been justiciable in the 
federal courts,”214 and lawsuits that implicate the governance structure of a church, even 
when they do not raise a question of religious doctrine, lie outside the power of the 
courts.  Secular “courts will not assume jurisdiction if doing so would interfere with the 
church’s management.”215
D. Qualified Immunity or Sovereign Immunity? 
The ministerial exception cases sometimes describe the exception as protecting a 
sphere in which religion is sovereign.  In Catholic University, for example, the D.C. 
Circuit explained its conclusion that ministerial exception doctrine still survives after the 
                                                 
211 Id.  
212 442 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 190 (2006). 
213 442 F.3d at 1037. 
214 442 F.3d at 1038. 
215 Id.  While the court in Tomic was addressing limits on the power of the federal courts, id., state courts 
also recognize that they lack the power to adjudicate lawsuits implicating a church’s ministerial 
employment relationships and internal governance structures.  See, e.g., Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.2d 
389, 405 (Tex. 2007) (professional-negligence claim against minister must be dismissed for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction because they “unconstitutionally impinges upon internal matters of church governance 
in violation of the First Amendment”); Callahan v. First Congregational Church of Haverhill, 808 N.E.2d 
301, 303-04, 308-09 (Mass. 2004) (constitutional rights of religious freedom prohibit trial court from 
exercising subject matter jurisdiction over pastor’s employment discrimination claims against church 
employer); Williams v. Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 766 N.E.2d 820, 824 (Mass. 2002) (Massachusetts 
case law “firmly establishe[s]” the principle that the First Amendment’s protection of religious freedom 
“precludes jurisdiction of civil courts over church disputes touching on matters of doctrine, canon law, 
polity, discipline, and ministerial relationships”); McDonnell v. Episcopal Diocese of Georgia, 381 S.E.2d 
126, 127 (Ga. App.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935 (1989) (affirming summary judgment to the diocese in an 
action brought by priest alleging breach of an employment contract; “The civil court cannot take 
jurisdiction of an ecclesiastical issue even if the parties present it for resolution, because the First 
Amendment prohibits such action by the civil judicial system.”).      
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Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith216 in these terms: “[W]e 
cannot believe that the Supreme Court in Smith intended to qualify the[e] century-old 
affirmation of a church’s sovereignty over its own affairs.”217  The Constitution 
recognizes that churches have sovereignty over their own internal affairs with respect to 
ministerial employment – in other words, the Constitution protects a church’s “right of 
autonomy in its own domain”218 – and this sovereignty overrides even the state’s strong 
interest in eliminating employment discrimination.219  Similarly, the Fourth Circuit in 
Rayburn understood the ministerial exception as a manifestation of the Supreme Court’s 
assertion that “both religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if 
each is left free from the other within its respective sphere.”220  Thus, the ministerial 
exception follows from the proposition that the First Amendment “recognizes two 
                                                 
216 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
217 83 F.3d at 463; see also Combs v. Central Texas Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 
173 F.3d 343, 349 (quoting Catholic University).  The “century-old affirmation of a church’s sovereignty 
over its own affairs” refers to the line church autonomy cases that find their foundation in Watson v. Jones, 
80 U.S. 679 (1871), Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1 (1929), Kedroff v. St. 
Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952), and Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 
696 (1976).  Every circuit to have addressed the question of the post-Smith survival of the ministerial 
exception have recognized the exception’s continued validity.  See EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of 
Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 800 n.* (4th Cir. 2000) (citing cases).  One circuit, over a strong dissent, seems to 
have avoided the question of the post-Smith validity of the ministerial exception by pointing to the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), not the ministerial exception, as the proper defense to be 
raised in a Methodist minister’s action against the church under the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act.  See Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96, (2d Cir. 2006); see also 441 F.3d at 109-19 (rejecting the court’s 
RFRA analysis in favor of a statutory ministerial exception) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Tomic, 
442 F.3d at 1042 (criticizing Hankins as “unsound” because RFRA is applicable only to suits in which the 
government is a party).  As the Tomic court explained, 
It is hardly to be imagined … that in seeking to broaden the protection of religious rights [after 
Smith], Congress, dropping nary a hint, wiped out a long-established doctrine that gives greater 
protection to religious autonomy than RFRA does.  Indeed, a serious constitutional issue would be 
presented if Congress by stripping away the ministerial exception required courts to decide 
religious questions.  The exception is based on the establishment and free-exercise clauses of the 
First Amendment, which place tight limits on governmental authority to regulate religion. 
442 F.3d at 1042 (citations omitted). 
218 83 F.3d at 467. 
219 Id. 
220 McCollum v. Board of Education 333 U.S. 402, 410 (1948), quoted in Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1171. 
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spheres of sovereignty”221 that structure the institutional relationship between 
government and religion. 
Rooting the ministerial exception in the First Amendment’s recognition of a 
protected sphere of religious sovereignty provides further support for understanding the 
exception as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction.  The Third Circuit in Petruska used 
an analogy to qualified immunity in support of its conclusion that the ministerial 
exception should be understood as a defense challenging the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s 
claim, rather than as a challenge to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.  But the better 
analogy may be to the jurisdictional defense of sovereign immunity, rather than the 
defense of qualified immunity.  While it is appropriate to raise the defense of qualified 
immunity in a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,222 the defense of 
sovereign immunity is generally understood to be an issue of subject matter 
jurisdiction223 properly raised in a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss.224
                                                 
221 Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 395 (Tex. 2007).  See also Part II, supra (the structural 
establishment protects a sphere of sovereignty for the church); Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and 
Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385, 
1392 (2004) (the no-establishment principle presupposes “the existence of dual authorities, each with its 
own sphere of proper jurisdiction and each with some jurisdiction held to the exclusion of the other”; 
“[S]ince the fourth century Western civilization has presupposed that there are not one but two sovereigns.  
Each has a jurisdiction of legitimate operation, and while there are areas of shared cognizance, there are 
other subject matter areas in which each is noncompetent to perform the tasks of the other.”).   
222 See, e.g., Goodman v. Town of Golden Beach, 988 F. Supp. 1450, 1455 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (“A 
government official’s entitlement to qualified immunity is a question of law that is appropriately 
determined before trial in one of three ways: (1) on a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim; (2) in a [Rule 12(c)] request for judgment on the pleadings; or (3) on [Rule 56] motion for summary 
judgment.”)   
223 See, e.g., FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 474 (1994) (“Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature.”) 
(referring to federal sovereign immunity); WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1354 
(“The natural consequence of the sovereign immunity principle is that the absence of consent by the United 
States is a fundamental defect that deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction.”); Calderon v. Ashmus, 
523 U.S. 740, 745 n.2 (1998) (“the Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional in the sense that it is a limitation 
on the federal courts’ judicial power, and therefore can be raised at any stage of the proceedings”); 
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984) (“[T]his Court has recognized 
that [the] greater significance [of the Eleventh Amendment] lies in its affirmation that the fundamental 
principle of [state] sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III.”); United States v. 
Texas Tech University, 171 F.3d 279, 285 (5th Cir. 1999) (“The Eleventh Amendment’s admonition is 
Forthcoming 17 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL (2008) 55
 The ministerial exception exists because the Constitution denies courts the 
authority to decide a defined category of cases.  Similarly, the various aspects of the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity deny courts the authority to hear and decide a defined 
category of cases: claims against governmental sovereigns, which are barred unless the 
sovereign has consented to suit,225 or, in the case of foreign sovereigns, unless Congress 
has granted the federal courts authority to hear the case.226  Unlike foreign sovereign 
immunity, which is a matter of grace and comity on the part of the United States, … not a 
restriction imposed by the Constitution,”227 the ministerial exception is a constitutionally 
imposed restriction on the power of courts.  Thus, when the ministerial exception applies, 
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment limit the Article III power of the federal 
courts in a way similar to the limit imposed on federal judicial power by the Eleventh 
Amendment and the doctrine of state sovereign immunity.  While the Eleventh 
                                                                                                                                                 
jurisdictional in nature. …”; it accomplishes its purpose of “preserving state sovereign immunity … 
through jurisdictional limitation”); cf. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 391 (1998) 
(“we have not decided” the question of whether “Eleventh Amendment immunity is a matter of subject-
matter jurisdiction”); Schact, 524 U.S. at 394 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (because it can be waived and 
courts need not raise it sua sponte, “the jurisdictional bar erected by the Eleventh Amendment” has a 
“hybrid nature”); Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997) (unlike Article III limits 
on judicial power which altogether disqualify federal court from deciding cases outside the reach of Article 
III, Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity can be waived; “The Amendment, in other words, enacts a 
sovereign immunity from suit, rather than a nonwaivable limit on the Federal Judiciary’s subject-matter 
jurisdiction.”).   
224 See, e.g, Hamm v. United States, 483 F.3d 135, 137 (2d Cir. 2007) (because sovereign immunity is 
jurisdictional in nature, where a waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply, a suit should be dismissed 
under Rule 12(b)(1), not 12(b)(6)); Nair v. Oakland County Community Mental Health Authority, 443 F.3d 
469, 476 (6th Cir. 2006) (threshold defense of state sovereign immunity is usually invoked “by way of 
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1)); Kirkham, 429 F.3d at 291 (“[P]arties seeking [Foreign Sovereign 
Immunity Act] immunity do so through Rule 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.”); WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1350 (the 12(b)(1) motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is appropriate “when the plaintiff’s claim is barred by one of 
the various aspects of the doctrine of sovereign immunity”). 
225 See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (“The United States, as sovereign, is immune 
from suit save as it consents to be sued, and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that 
court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.”) 
226 Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. City of New York, 127 S. Ct. 2352, 2355 (2007) 
(the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act “‘provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign 
state in federal court’”) (quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439 
(1989)). 
227 Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983). 
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Amendment has been interpreted as “an exemplification” of a “fundamental rule” of state 
sovereignty,228 the line of cases stemming from Watson teach that the First Amendment 
stands as an exemplification of a fundamental rule of church autonomy.  Like the 
Eleventh Amendment, the jurisdictional bar raised by the First Amendment ministerial 
exception “operates as an additional boundary on [judicial] power, supplementing the 
restraints on judicial power already implicitly provided in Article III of the 
Constitution.”229      
The defense of qualified immunity is quite different.  Qualified immunity is not a 
limitation on judicial power to hear and decide a certain category of cases.  Instead, 
qualified immunity protects certain categories of defendants from having to defend a suit 
under certain factual conditions.  “The defense of ‘qualified immunity’ requires courts to 
enter judgment in favor of a government employee unless the employee’s conduct 
violates ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known.’”230 The subject matter of the lawsuits against government 
officials are clearly within the judicial power of the court, and if the relevant factual 
conditions do not exist, the defendant will be required to defend the action and the court 
has the power to enter judgment against them.231
This protection afforded governmental officials by the defense of qualified 
immunity is not mandated by the Constitution.  Instead, the Supreme Court has created 
the existing doctrine of qualified immunity in order to foster particular policy goals:  
                                                 
228 See In re State of New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921). 
229 Texas Tech, 171 F.3d at 285 (referring to the Eleventh Amendment). 
230 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2640 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 
231 See Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the Role of Facts in 
Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1997) (describing the availability of damages in 
Bivens actions and under § 1983). 
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providing immunity from suit for “all but the plainly incompetent or those who 
knowingly violated the law”232 is intended to reduce the social costs of litigation against 
governmental officials, which include “the increased expense to the government, the 
diversion of official attention from official duties, and the deterrence of able citizens from 
pursuing public office.”233  Because this particular structure of immunity protection is not 
required by the Constitution, Congress could, if it wished, create a different sort of 
immunity defense in actions against governmental employees that allege violations of 
constitutional or statutory rights.234  In contrast, the ministerial exception is a 
constitutionally compelled limitation on the power of civil authorities.  Thus, the analogy 
to qualified immunity invoked by the Third Circuit in Petruska is not persuasive.  The 
ministerial exception seems more closely akin to the jurisdictional defense of sovereign 
immunity, rather than to the conditional immunity from suit defense established by the 
doctrine of qualified immunity. 
E. Does It Matter? 
It may seem as though the question of whether the ministerial exception should be 
characterized as a jurisdictional defense or as a defense challenging the legal sufficiency 
of the plaintiff’s claim is a question without practical significance.235  Whether the 
exception is asserted as a 12(b)(1) defense or as a 12(b)(6) defense, the plaintiff’s claim 
will be dismissed at the outset of the litigation if the ministerial exception applies.  If 
                                                 
232 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). 
233 Chaim Saiman, Interpreting Immunity, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1155, 1161 (2005) (citing Harlow, 457 
U.S. at 814); see also Chen, supra note __, at 11-12 (immunity law arises out of the Supreme Court’s 
struggle to balance the benefits of compensating individuals harmed by official misconduct against the 
competing social policy concerns that arise from lawsuits against public officials).  
234 See Jon O. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage 
Remedy for Law Enforcers’ Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 461-63 & 461-62 n.59 (1978). 
235 Cf. Schleicher, 2008 WL 516892, at *5 (characterizing dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) rather than under 
Rule 12(c) as a “mistake, though a harmless one”). 
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there “is no realistic possibility” that dismissing the action for failure to state a claim 
“will expand the court’s power beyond the limits that the jurisdictional restriction has 
imposed,”236 why spend much energy thinking about this question?  There are at least 
two reasons why it is important to get the answer to this question right. 
1.  Clear Affirmation of the Penultimacy of the State 
Limits on the subject matter jurisdiction of courts are a manifestation of 
limitations on governmental power.  This is the most important reason why a proper 
understanding the jurisdictional character of the ministerial exception makes a difference 
in the law    When federal and state courts clearly and consistently treat the ministerial 
exception as a limitation on their subject matter jurisdiction, they make a powerful 
statement about the foundations of limited government:  Such statements affirm the 
penultimacy of the state.237  The ministerial exception is rooted in this fundamental 
                                                 
236 Cf. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States, 529 U.S. 765 (2000).  The Court in Vermont 
Agency was faced with a case that raised two questions: (1) whether the federal False Claims Act should be 
interpreted to create a cause of action that permits an individual to bring an action on behalf of the United 
States against a state, and (2) whether such a suit by an individual against a state would be barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment.  The Court concluded that the question of statutory interpretation was logically 
antecedent to the Eleventh Amendment question and that there was “no realistic possibility that addressing 
the statutory question [would] expand the Court’s power beyond the limits that the jurisdictional restriction 
has imposed.  The question whether the statute provide[d] for suits against the States … d[id] not, as a 
practical matter, permit the court to pronounce upon the rights of any person, beyond the issues and persons 
that would be reached under the Eleventh Amendment inquiry anyway.”  529 U.S. at 779.  The Court 
explained that “[t]his combination of logical priority and virtual coincidence of scope makes it possible, 
and indeed appropriate, to decide the statutory issue first.”  529 U.S. at 779-80.  In the context of the 
ministerial exception, however, the court is not faced with the logically prior question of whether or not the 
law creates a cause of action allowing a particular employment discrimination claim to be asserted against a 
religious institution.  The ministerial plaintiff typically has raised a claim under a statute that creates a 
cause of action for employment discrimination that (as the Fourth Circuit held in Rayburn, in the Title VII 
context) creates no statutory exception excluding religious employers from the coverage of the statute.  The 
constitutional question of whether the First Amendment limits the judicial authority to decide this class of 
cases must, therefore, be confronted directly.  Such “[q]uestions of jurisdiction, of course, should be given 
priority – since if there is no jurisdiction there is no authority to sit in judgment of anything else.”  529 U.S. 
at 778 (citing Steel Co., 523 U.S., at 93-102).     
237 The phrase, “penultimacy of the state,” is drawn from Robert W. Tuttle, How Firm a Foundation? 
Protecting Religious Land Uses After Boerne, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 861, 865 (2000); cf. Thomas C. 
Berg, The Pledge of Allegiance and the Limited State, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 41, 77 (2003) (“‘Under God’ 
in the Pledge of Allegiance is a means for the state to declare that it is a limited institution that is subject to, 
and does not interfere with, higher commitments and norms.  In a religiously pluralistic society, however, 
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principle of limited government: the civil authority, including the courts, has “a 
constitutionally prescribed sphere of action,”238 and this civil sphere of authority is 
separate from the sphere of action reserved to religion. 
As the Supreme Court noted in Steel Co., 
Much more than legal niceties are at stake here.  The … constitutional elements of 
jurisdiction are an essential ingredient of separation and equilibration of powers, 
restraining the courts from acting at certain times, and even restraining them from 
acting permanently regarding certain subjects.  For a court to pronounce upon the 
meaning or the constitutionality of a state or federal law when it has no 
jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, for a court to act ultra vires.239
 
Thus, because the ministerial exception recognizes a constitutional limit to authorized 
judicial action, it has a “separation and equilibration of powers” function.  It keeps the 
power of government separate from a sphere of action exclusively reserved to religion.  
When a court fails to recognize that limitation on its power, the court acts ultra vires, and 
offends the fundamental constitutional principle of non-establishment.240   
 Paying careful attention to the limits of governmental power is about much more 
than “legal niceties.”  The way in which courts speak about the character of the 
ministerial exception shapes the way judges, lawyers, and citizens understand the 
relationship between government and religion.  The law has a pedagogical function, and 
the ways in which the law speaks to us (and the ways in which we speak about the law) 
shape the way we look at the world.241  As Cathleen Kaveny explains, “Always and 
                                                                                                                                                 
‘under God’ is an imperfect way of making that declaration.  But if ‘under God’ is removed from the 
Pledge, the state must … make other efforts to declare and respect its own limits.”).  
238 Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102 n.4 (subject-matter jurisdiction limitations keep courts “within their 
constitutionally prescribed sphere of action”). 
239 523 U.S.  at 101-02. 
240 Cf. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94 (for a court to decide a merits question before addressing the jurisdictional 
question of standing “carries the courts beyond the bounds of authorized judicial action and thus offends 
fundamental principles of separation of powers”). 
241 See, e.g., J.B. WHITE, HERACLES BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 28, 35 
(1985) (law is a form of “constitutive rhetoric”; the study of law is an inquiry into the ways in which “we 
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everywhere, law teaches a moral lesson – it imbues a vision of how the members of a 
particular society should live their lives together.”242  We should attend to the 
jurisdictional character of the ministerial exception, because the ministerial exception 
teaches an important lesson; the ministerial exception serves as a critical institutional 
reminder of what Robert Tuttle has called “government’s penultimacy – government’s 
reticence, and even respect, in the face of its citizens’ obligations to the transcendent.”243
  Professor Tuttle argues that the distinctive place occupied by religious 
institutions in the American constitutional order serves to highlight the state’s reticence 
before the transcendent.  When the First Amendment bars application of otherwise 
neutral employment discrimination laws to the ministerial choices of religious 
institutions, the Constitution “testifies to the limited nature of its own authority.”244  For 
Tuttle, “this testimony lacks a clear secular justification – precisely because it is a 
theological argument. … The exceptional nature of religious belief and conduct depends 
on a religious justification: that God is God, and the state is not.”245   
Tuttle and his colleague Ira Lupu have tried to articulate a justification for the 
distinctive role of religion in the constitutional that they argue is rooted in a political 
concept of religion, rather than in a theological starting point.  Their argument, however, 
                                                                                                                                                 
constitute ourselves as individuals, as communities, and as cultures, whenever we speak” as lawyers and 
judges) (1985); Patrick McKinley Brennan, Against Sovereignty: A Cautionary Note on the Normative 
Power of the Actual, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 111-12, 135, 138-39 (2006) (noting that how we talk 
about the law, and how we hear courts talking about the law, has an effect on who we become as people); 
M. Cathleen Kaveny, Assisted Suicide, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutive Function of the Law, 27 
HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 29 (1997) (“[T]hose who play a role in the legal enterprise are engaged in a 
type of ‘constitutive rhetoric’ that actually helps shape the moral identity of the community in which they 
participate.  The community constituting character of law does not inhere solely in the results that issue in 
particular cases, but also in the very way the questions are framed for decision.”) 
242 M. Cathleen Kaveny, Autonomy, Solidarity and Law’s Pedagogy, 27 LOUVAIN STUDIES 339, 341 
(2002).  Once we “acknowledge the fact that law teaches,” we can “take responsibility for what it teaches.”  
Id. 
243 Tuttle, How Firm a Foundation?, supra note __, at 865. 
244 Id. at 923. 
245 Id. 
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resonates with both Professor Esbeck’s theory of the structural establishment clause and 
with John Courtney Murray’s understanding of the freedom of the church.  Lupu and 
Tuttle begin with the proposition that the founders established a new political order that 
was distinguished by its “limited horizons.”  “Its powers would be restricted to the 
temporal welfare of its citizens.”  This limit on the jurisdiction of government, precluding 
government from having a religious confession of its own, “avoid[s] both conflict among 
religious factions for political authority and the inevitable despotism of the religious 
faction that won out.”  Pursuant to this political concept of religion, “‘religion’ represents 
that which the new order disclaims: jurisdiction over ultimate truths, a comprehensive 
claim to undivided loyalty, and a command to worship.”246
The constitutional distinctiveness of religion – “a sense of boundary between state 
and some aspects of institutional [religious] behavior” – is rooted in this recognition of 
the limited nature of the state.  There are some aspects of human life that the state simply 
has no right to control.  The constitutional distinctiveness of religion thus serves as a 
check on totalitarianism, insulating from state control those aspects of the behavior of 
religious institutions that nurture the spirit directly.247
For Lupu and Tuttle, this political doctrine of religion creates a relatively 
restricted distinctive sphere for religious institutions: 
The role of the contemporary state is broad indeed, but it remains circumscribed 
by its penultimacy.  Life’s ultimate questions are to be left in private hands, and 
when those hands are institutional, the state must respect the internal life and self-
governance of such institutions.  Most importantly, [this] approach is consistent 
with the duality of roles of religious institutions in contemporary America.  When 
[religious institutions] institutions perform functions indistinguishable from other 
segments of the nonprofit world, the law should treat them as their secular 
                                                 
246 Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in our Constitutional Order, 47 
VILL. L. REV. 37, 84 (2002). 
247 Id.  
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counterparts are treated.  When, however, religious institutions act in uniquely 
religious ways, making connections with the world beyond the temporal and 
material concerns that are the proper jurisdiction of the state, the legally 
distinctive qualities of such institutions begin to emerge.  It is only by exploring 
the intrinsic limit on state power to affect these ultimate concerns, rather than by 
mining the desires, activities or teachings of religious organizations, that the 
distinctive place of religious entities in our constitutional order can be located.248  
    
The ministerial exception finds a secure home within this understanding of the 
constitutionally protected sphere in which religious institutions function insulated from 
state control.  But can the law articulate principled, workable jurisdictional boundaries for 
this sphere?  And does a workable understanding of religion’s sovereign sphere provide 
adequate protection for the theological principle of the freedom of the church as it is 
understood by Murray and in the Vatican II Declaration on Religious Freedom? 
A jurisdictional line that tries to draw a distinction between claims that implicate 
“inherently religious activities” and those that do not is not workable – for a theological 
reason.  There is a “religious density” to all things,249 and the whole world “is charged 
with the grandeur of God.”250  It is, therefore, not possible to draw precise jurisdictional 
                                                 
248 Id. at 92. 
249 See Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J., Ignatian Spirituality and the Life of the Lawyer: Finding God in All 
Things – Even in the Ordinary Practice of the Law, 46 J. CATH. L. STUD. 7, 19-20 (2007). 
250 Gerard Manley Hopkins, S.J., “God’s Grandeur,” in GERARD MANLEY HOPKINS (THE OXFORD 
AUTHORS) 128 (Catherine Phillips, ed. 1986).   As Karl Rahner explains, 
Because God is greater than everything, , God can be found if one flees away from the world, but 
God can come to meet one on the streets in the midst of the world.  For this reason Ignatius 
acknowledges only one law in his restless search for God: to seek God in all things; and this 
means: to seek God in that spot where at any particular time God wants to be found, and it means, 
too, to seek God in the world if God wants to show God’s self in it. … Ignatius is concerned only 
with the God above the whole world, but he knows that this God, precisely by being really above 
the whole world and not merely the dialectical antithesis to the whole world, is also to be found in 
the world, when God’s sovereign will bids us to enter upon the way of the world. 
Karl Rahner, S.J., Ignatian Mysticism of Joy in the World, in KARL RAHNER: THEOLOGIAN OF THE GRACED 
SEARCH FOR MEANING 93-94 (Geffrey B. Kelly, ed. 1992) 
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lines between the sacred and the secular, or between the spiritual and the temporal.251  All 
human activity can be understood as having an “inherently religious” dimension.  
Accordingly, the constitutionally mandated jurisdictional line must be articulated 
in other terms.  The protected sphere of religion that is beyond the jurisdiction of civil 
authority might be better defined as the realm of “uniquely religious” activities (Lupu & 
Tuttle) or the realm of exclusively religious activities (Esbeck).  In this realm, religion is 
sovereign and exercises sole jurisdiction.  When religion is doing its own thing, its 
activities are off limits.  But when religious institutions – as they must – embody their 
religious mission through temporal social service activities that are not uniquely religious 
(even though they are inherently religious), they are engaged in activity that the civil 
authority has jurisdiction to regulate for public order reasons. 
What sorts of claims are jurisdictionally barred by a constitutionally mandated 
jurisdictional line drawn to protect uniquely or exclusively religious activities?  The 
ministerial exception cases establish a realm of autonomy for church polity and 
administration, for matters of internal church governance and administration.  The 
selection and dismissal of ministers, and the terms of the ministerial service, fall squarely 
within this sovereign religious realm.  The employment of ministers is a uniquely 
religious activity; it lies at the core of religion’s own thing.           
The constitutionally mandated jurisdictional line exemplified by the ministerial 
exception does provide significant constitutional protection to the theological principle of 
the freedom of the church.  The question of the appointment of ministers is at the heart of 
                                                 
251 See Leslie Griffin, The Integration of Spiritual and Temporal: Contemporary Roman Catholic Church-
State Theory, 48 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 225, 251 (1987); BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, supra note __, at 
111 (suggesting that the actual boundaries between the realm of secular authority and that of spiritual 
authority can not, “by the very nature of the problem, be defined abstractly”); id. at 107 (there are likely 
always to be “disputes at the boundaries of the ecclesiastical and secular powers”) 
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church autonomy; indeed the question of the role to be played by secular authorities in 
the investiture of bishops was at the heart of the medieval controversy in which the 
“freedom of the church” became a revolutionary slogan.252   
In order for the jurisdictional line that defines the constitutionally protected 
exclusive jurisdiction of religion to be a workable principle of law, however, it may need 
to be drawn in a way that limits the sovereign sphere of religion to activities that can be 
described as uniquely or exclusively activity.  Under this jurisdictional framework, much 
inherently religious activity will inevitably be subject to civil regulation.  In order for the 
church to be the church, it must be able to engage in social service activity in the world.  
As Murray noted nearly fifty years ago, the freedom of the church must include the 
freedom to fulfill her “spiritual mission of social justice and peace.”253  More recently, in 
his first encyclical, entitled Deus Caritas Est (God is Love), Benedict XVI forcefully 
affirmed that love of God grounds a love of neighbor that must be expressed through 
ecclesial service to the community.  Indeed, such social service activity is a constitutive 
element of what it means for the church to be church: 
[T]he exercise of charity became established as one of [the church’s] essential 
activities, along with the administration of the sacraments and the proclamation of 
the word: Love for widows and orphans, prisoners and the sick and needy of 
every kind is as essential to her ministry as the ministry of the sacraments and 
preaching of the Gospel.  The church cannot neglect the service of charity 
anymore than she can neglect the sacraments and the word. … These duties 
presuppose each other and are inseparable.  For the church, charity is not a kind of 
welfare activity which could equally well be left to others but is a part of her 
nature, an indispensable expression of her very being.254  
                                                 
252 See BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, supra note __, at 94-113 (discussing the investiture controversy at 
the heart of the “papal revolution” of the eleventh and twelfth centuries); id. at 99 (“The separation, 
concurrence, and interaction of the spiritual and secular jurisdictions [that was the result of the papal 
revolution] was a principal source of the Western legal tradition.”) 
253 MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS, supra note __, at 75. 
254 Benedict XVI, Deus Caritas Est, ##22 & 25, 35 ORIGINS 541, 549-50 (2006); see also Brady, Religious 
Organizations and Free Exercise, supra note __, at 1697-98 (the activities of Catholic social services 
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The social welfare services provided by a religious entity like Catholic Charities cannot, 
therefore, be understood as a simply secular or temporal activity. Instead the concrete 
human services provided by Catholic Charities are an inherently religious undertaking 
that expresses the “deepest nature” of the church.255  At the same time, while the church 
cannot simply leave this activity to others, there are a range of non-religious groups, as 
well as the government itself, that provide similar services for non-religious reasons. 
Thus, the church’s inherently religious ministry of social welfare service falls outside the 
sphere of the uniquely or exclusively religious.  As activity outside of that sphere, it may 
find itself subject to civil regulation that applies generally to social service providers or to 
secular employers, and these regulations may be justified by governmental interests that 
are properly characterized as public order concerns providing a legitimate basis for 
governmental action. 
2. Issues Related to Removal and Supplemental Jurisdiction 
The question of the jurisdictional status of the ministerial exception can become 
an issue of practical significance with respect to removal and supplemental jurisdiction.  
Religious institutions that have been sued in state court by ministers who raise 
employment discrimination claims that include alleged violations of federal anti-
discrimination statutes have on occasion removed those actions to federal court and then 
invoked the ministerial exception as grounds for dismissal of the action.  Because 
assertion of the ministerial exception is a way of asserting that a court has no subject 
matter jurisdiction over a ministerial employment discrimination claim, this removal is 
                                                                                                                                                 
agencies may appear secular, but they are “suffused with religious significance”; “For the Catholic Church, 
social services activities are no more secular than worship and preaching.”). 
255 Deus Caritas Est, #25, supra note __, at 550. 
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improper, because there is no basis for original federal jurisdiction over such a claim.256  
The federal court, therefore, has no power to dismiss an improperly removed case; the 
federal court has power only to remand the case to state court for dismissal of the barred 
claim.257  
Confusion regarding the nature of the ministerial exception seems to have led the 
court to overlook this consequence of the jurisdictional character of the exception in Ross 
v. Metropolitan Church of God.258  Mr. Ross, an African American, the former Pastor of 
Worship Arts of the Metropolitan Church of God, filed an action against the Church in 
Georgia state court after he was fired by the Church’s pastor.  The action alleged 
wrongful termination on the basis of race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, along with 
three state law causes of action: breach of contract, breach of implied-in-fact contract, 
                                                 
256 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the 
United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district 
court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.”); 
16 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 107.14[1] (“An action filed in state court may not be removed unless 
the federal district courts have jurisdiction of the action.”).  Removal might conceivably be proper if the 
plaintiff’s claims included some ground for original jurisdiction in the district court other than the barred 
federal employment discrimination claim, such as state-law contract claims against completely diverse 
defendants.  Cf. Schacht, 524 U.S. at 386 (“[T]he presence in an otherwise removable case of a claim that 
the Eleventh Amendment may bar does not destroy removal jurisdiction that would otherwise exist.”) 
(emphasis added).   
257 See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”); 16 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 
107.14[3][b][ii] (“Section 1447(c) means that if it is discovered that federal jurisdiction is lacking, at any 
stage in the proceedings, a removed case must be remanded to state court rather than dismissed.”); id. at 
§ 107.41[1][d][ii] (“[T]he district court may not dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but, 
rather, must remand the case to state court, even when the district court believes that pursuing the case in 
state court is futile on the merits.”); Int’l Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane 
Educational Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 87 (1991) (“Since the district court had no original jurisdiction over this 
case, … a finding that removal was improper deprives that court of subject matter jurisdiction and obliges a 
remand under the terms of § 1447(c)) (overruled by statute on other grounds); id. at 89 (“‘the literal words 
of § 1447(c) … on their face, give … no discretion to dismiss rather than remand an action’”) (quoting 
Maine Assn. of Interdependent Neighborhoods v. Commissioner, Maine Dept. of Human Services, 876 
F.2d 1051, 1054 (1st Cir. 1989)); Parker v. Della Rocco, 252 F.3d 663, 666 (2d Cir. 2001) (§ 1447(c) 
“addresses the consequences of a jurisdictional flaw, i.e., it mandates a remand rather than a dismissal”) 
258 471 F. Supp.2d 1306 (N.D. Ga. 2007). 
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and promissory estoppel.  The Church then removed the action to federal court, arguing 
that the § 1981 claim gave the court federal-question jurisdiction over the case.259
After removal, the Church moved to dismiss Mr. Ross’s complaint under Rule 
12(b)(6), on the ground that his § 1981 claim was barred by the ministerial exception.  
The court agreed, and dismissed Mr. Ross’s § 1981 claim.260  Because the applicability of 
the ministerial exception means that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter 
of the claim, the court erred in dismissing the claim, rather than remanding the case to 
state court.261  The court then compounded its error by going on to determine whether it 
should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Ross’s remaining state law claims, 
which, as contract claims, were not barred by the ministerial exception.262  The court 
concluded that the state-law claims should be remanded to state court, but it analyzed the 
issue as if retaining jurisdiction over the state law claims was within its power as a matter 
                                                 
259 471 F. Supp.2d at 1307. 
260 471 F. Supp.2d at 1312. 
261 See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and note __, supra.  The same error is evident in Werft v. Desert Southwest 
Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2004).  In Werft, a Methodist 
minister resigned his position after his church employer refused to accommodate his Attention Deficit 
Disorder, dyslexia, and heart problems.  He filed an action against the church in state court in Arizona.  The 
complaint alleged violations of three federal statutes (Title VII, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans 
with Disabilities Act), and the Arizona Civil Rights Act.  The church removed the case to federal district 
court and then filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on the ground that “the First 
Amendment precluded civil court review of the Church’s ministerial employment decisions.”  377 F.3d at 
1100.  The district court granted the motion, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.  Because the claims implicated 
the employment relationship between church and minister, the district court “properly dismissed” the 
claims.  377 F.3d at 1104.  If, however, the ministerial exception is properly understood to deprive civil 
courts of jurisdiction over ministerial employment discrimination claims, this removed action was not 
properly dismissed; pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) it should have been remanded to state court, and once 
back in state court, the action should have been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
262 “While the ministerial exception  generally applies to bar state tort claims that require an inquiry into 
church administrative decisionmaking, it has generally not been held to bar state law contract claims, 
because ‘application of state contract law does not involve government-imposed limits on [a church’s] right 
to select its ministers,’ but rather seeks to enforce a purely voluntary promise.” 471 F. Supp.2d at 1309 n.2 
(quoting Petruska, 462 F.3d at 310); see also Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conf. of the United Methodist 
Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (minister’s contract claim not barred by First 
Amendment so long as adjudication of the claim would not create excessive entanglement with religion). 
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of discretion under the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  Under the 
statute, 
in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the 
district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so 
related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part 
of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States 
Constitution.263
 
If, however, the district court dismisses all the claims over which it had original 
jurisdiction, § 1367(c) provides that the court “may,” in its discretion, “decline to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over the remaining state-law claims.264  Because the 
only federal-law claim in the case had been dismissed in the early stages of the litigation, 
the court in Ross concluded that considerations of comity, judicial economy, fairness, and 
convenience all favored remanding the contract claims to state court for resolution.265  
Yet in reaching this decision the court seemed to assume that it retained the power under 
§ 1367 to hear and decide the state-law claims if doing so made sense in the interests of 
judicial economy, convenience, fairness to the litigants, and comity.  This power only 
exists, however, when the court at one point had before it a civil action over which it had 
original jurisdiction.  Because the ministerial exception deprived the district court in Ross 
of original jurisdiction over the § 1981 claim, the court never had supplemental 
jurisdiction over the related state-law claims, and, therefore, the court never possessed the 
power, in its discretion, to hear and decide those claims.266  Its only choice was to remand 
the state-law claims to state court. 
                                                 
263 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (emphasis added). 
264 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). 
265 471 F. Supp.2d at 1312-13. 
266 Cf. 16 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 107.14[3][b][ii] (If federal question jurisdiction exists at the time 
of removal, but the federal question claim is defeated on the merits, district courts retain discretion to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims arising from the same case or controversy. … Once 
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A similar situation may arise when a plaintiff chooses to file an action in federal 
court, joining state law claims to the federal employment discrimination claim that 
purports to give the federal court original jurisdiction.  In Petruska for example,  Sister 
Petruska joined several state-law claim to her Title VII sex discrimination claim against 
Gannon University.  The district court dismissed all of her claims for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.  On appeal, the Third Circuit, concluded that the ministerial exception 
did not bar her breach of contract claim; unlike her Title VII claim, the breach of contract 
claim did not involve government imposed limits on the University’s right to select its 
ministerial employees.267  Thus, the Third Circuit held that the claims barred by the 
ministerial exception should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, while the contract 
claim should be remanded to the district court.  That court, the Third Circuit seemed to 
assume, possessed the power to hear and decide the contract claim so long as resolution 
of the claim would not unduly entangle the court with religious matters in violation of the 
Establishment Clause by requiring the court to decide doctrinal issues or engage in any 
inquiry regarding ecclesiastical issues.268
If this contract claim is to go forward, however, it should (in the absence of 
complete diversity) be in state court, not federal court.  Because the ministerial exception 
placed excluded her Title VII claim from the original jurisdiction of the district court, that 
court never had supplemental jurisdiction over Sister Petruska’s state law claims.  Thus 
the district court cannot now retain supplemental jurisdiction to give any further 
                                                                                                                                                 
supplemental jurisdiction exists, it remains, subject to the discretionary provision for remand.”) (emphasis 
added).   
267 462 F.3d at 310 (“Enforcement of a promise, willingly made and supported by consideration, in no way 
constitutes a state-imposed limit upon a church’s free exercise rights.  Accordingly, application of state law 
to Petruska’s contract claim would not violate the Free Exercise Clause.”). 
268 462 F.3d at 312. 
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consideration to her contract claim, even if it is not barred by the ministerial exception.  
The Third Circuit’s mistake with respect to the jurisdictional character of the ministerial 
exception led it incorrectly to assume that the district court had power to decide this 
remaining claim on remand.        
CONCLUSION 
When neutral regulations of general application justified by a public order 
rationale impose upon the church requirements that conflict with the church’s doctrinal 
commitments, the church’s freedom to engage in its ministry is burdened.  Because the 
ministry of social service takes place outside of the exclusive sphere of religion, the 
freedom of the church seems here to collide with the nature of the free exercise analysis 
established by the Court in Smith.  Thus, current constitutional doctrine does allow 
government to impose restrictions on the freedom of the church when the church is 
engaged in activity outside of the exclusively religious sphere.  Even in the context of 
state constitutional claims where Smith may not apply, the freedom of the church is not 
entirely secure.  Thus, even a return to the pre-Smith analysis under the federal 
constitution’s free exercise clause may not provide robust protection to the freedom of 
the church when it is acting outside its sovereign sphere. 
The jurisdictional analysis that this Article examines will not solve that problem.  
But, given the religious density of all things, perhaps it is asking too much to expect the 
legal principles that flow from the Constitution to provide a simple, clear-cut, easy-to-
apply doctrinal rule protecting the theological principle of the freedom of the church.  It 
may not be possible to translate completely that theological principle into the language of 
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constitutional law.269  This difficulty, however, makes it all the more critical that we 
understand and apply the necessarily imperfect translation of that principle that is found 
in the constitutionally mandated jurisdictional limits on civil authority exemplified by the 
ministerial exception.  This jurisdictional limit implements our Constitution’s recognition 
that the state is not the ultimate authority in all things – it embodies the constitutionally 
mandated principle that some things are above or beyond the jurisdiction of the law 
precisely because the First Amendment stands as an affirmation of the penultimacy of the 
state.  Thus, clearly and consistently acknowledging this jurisdictional limit might teach 
us all to treat the claims of religious institutions with respect and sensitivity,270 even 
when those institutions pursue their missions through inherently religious activity in the 
jurisdictional sphere that lies outside of the realm of exclusive religious sovereignty. 
 
                                                 
269 Cf. White, supra note __, at 180 (“[O]ne can think of every act of judicial interpretation as a kind of 
translation, necessarily imperfect, from one world to another, one mind to another.”) 
270 Id. at 189 (“in talking in a certain way about the Constitution we make it real”).  White explains that the 
First Amendment calls for “a set of attitudes that will enable us to face and live with the problem it insists 
upon putting before us, the impossible but necessary task of talking about religion in the language of the 
law. … [O]ur hope at the end might be that we could achieve a condition of ‘religious concord’ based not, 
… upon contempt, credulity, or cynicism, but upon respect.”  Id. at 201-02.  
